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LONG-TERM BIAS
Michal Barzuza*
and Eric Talley**
An emerging consensus in certain legal, business, and
scholarly communities maintains that corporate managers are
pressured unduly into chasing short-term gains at the expense
of superior long-term prospects. The forces inducing managerial myopia are easy to spot, typically embodied by activist
hedge funds and Wall Street gadflies with outsized appetites
for current quarterly earnings. Warnings about the dangers of
“short termism” have become so well established, in fact, that
they are now driving changes to mainstream practice as courts,
regulators and practitioners fashion legal and transactional
constraints designed to insulate firms and managers from the
influence of investor short-termism. This Article draws on academic research and a series of case studies to advance the thesis that the emergent folk wisdom about short-termism is incomplete. A growing literature in behavioral finance and
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psychology now provides sound reasons to conclude that corporate managers often fall prey to long-term bias—excessive optimism about their own long-term projects. We illustrate several plausible instantiations of such biases using case studies
from three prominent companies where managers have arguably succumbed to a form of “long-termism” in their own corporate stewardship. Unchecked, long-termism can impose substantial costs on investors that are every bit as damaging as
short-termism. Moreover, we argue that long-term managerial
bias sheds considerable light on the paradox of why shorttermism evidently persists among supposedly sophisticated financial market participants: shareholder activism—even if
unambiguously myopic—can provide a symbiotic counter-ballast against managerial long-termism. Without a more definitive understanding of the interaction between short- and longterm biases, then, policymakers should be cautious about embracing reforms that focus solely on half of the problem.
“[H]ere we are . . . [w]hen you look at what has
happened, what did you do wrong? I think that—
well, one, I don’t think the story has yet played out.
. . . A lot of tech turnaround adds we do take five,
six, seven years . . . .”1
Marissa Mayer, March 10, 2016
“My opinion is that, philosophically, I’m doing the
right thing in trying to shake up some of these
managements. It’s a problem in America today that
we are not nearly as productive as we should be.”2
Carl Icahn, October 22, 2014

See Kara Swisher, Marissa Mayer Says Marissa Mayer ‘Would Love
to Be Running Yahoo’ Next Year, RECODE (Mar. 10, 2016),
https://www.vox.com/2016/3/10/11586886/marissa-mayer-says-marissamayer-would-love-to-be-running-yahoo-next
[https://perma.cc/SUR4U9VZ].
2 James
Chen, Icahn Lift, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/icahn-lift.asp
[https://perma.cc/9YA5-WMQH].
1
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I. INTRODUCTION
The perceived dangers of “short-termism” in public capital
markets have come to occupy center stage as a chief concern
for corporate America. During the last decade, an emerging
conventional wisdom has taken root among lawyers, business
commentators, judges, policymakers and (at least some) investors, asserting that managers of public companies are all
too often pressured to pursue short-term gains at the expense
of managing for long-term value.
Although concerns about short-termism in capital markets
are hardly new3 (ebbing and flowing for over a quarter century4), the recent rise of hedge fund activism and corporate
governance intermediation has added a sense of urgency—if
not emergency—to the critical chorus warning of the perils of
myopia. Leo Strine, the former Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court, has cautioned that “there is a danger that activist stockholders will make proposals motivated by interests
other than maximizing the long-term, sustainable profitability of the corporation.”5 Martin Lipton, a patriarch of company-side mergers and acquisitions, echoes these concerns, issuing stern rebukes to activists who, he argues, “are preying
3 As far back as 1980, a provocative and influential article in the Harvard Business Review predicted that corporate management’s “devotion to
short-term returns and ‘management by the numbers’” was bringing about
a “decline in competitiveness of U.S. companies.” Robert H. Hayes & William J. Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, 58 HARV. BUS.
REV. 67, 70, 77 (1980).
4 See, e.g., Kevin J. Laverty, Economic "Short-Termism": The Debate,
the Unresolved Issues, and the Implications for Management Practice and
Research, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 825 (1996).
5 Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question
We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their
Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. L. 1, 8 (2010)
[hereinafter Strine, Fundamental Question]; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who
Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge
Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE
L.J. 1870, 1885 (2017) [hereinafter Strine, Who Bleeds] (“[H]uman investors
are exposed to . . . changes in corporate behavior influenced by stock market
forces such as hedge fund activism: a short-term increase in productivity
and stock price at the expense of long-term reinvestment and wage growth
will likely harm the overall ‘portfolio’ of the human investor.”).
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on American corporations to create short-term increases in
the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term
value.”6 “This pervasive short-termism,” Lipton cautions, “is
eroding the overall economy and putting our nation at a major
competitive disadvantage . . . .”7
Much of the ensuing debate about short-termism has
tended to revolve around competing claims concerning the
phenomenon in isolation. Many skeptics of the “shorttermism” critique, for example, have rejoined that arbitrage
activity in efficient capital markets should be a natural corrective mechanism that eviscerates (or substantially dampens) most of the alleged short-term biases.8 Others have questioned the magnitude of the phenomenon,9 or argued that
claims about short-termism are little more than a disingenuous smokescreen for managerial agency costs and empire
building.10 Nevertheless, manifest concerns about the perils of
6 Martin Lipton, Important Questions About Activist Hedge Funds,
HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 9, 2013),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/09/important-questions-about-activist-hedge-funds/ [https://perma.cc/YYQ4-JMEC].
7 Martin Lipton, Some Thoughts for Board of Directors in 2017, HARV.
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/08/some-thoughts-for-boards-ofdirectors-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/BH9K-YK96].
8 See e.g., Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom
and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. L. 977, 987 (2013) (“If short-term stock market
pressures are inducing firms to give up value over the long run, then firms
and markets would find themselves with incentives to develop institutions
and mechanisms to facilitate that long-run profitability.”); Jonathan Macey,
Their Bark is Bigger Than Their Bite: An Essay on Who Bleeds When the
Wolves Bite, 126 YALE L.J. F. 526, 535 (2017) (“The efficient capital market
hypothesis implies that it is virtually impossible for an activist hedge fund
to outperform the market without illegally using material inside information unless they improve corporate performance.”).
9 See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, Are U.S. Companies Too Short-Term Oriented? Some Thoughts (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
23464, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2980552
[https://perma.cc/5ZEX-GVK4] (despite ongoing short-termism concerns
that “corporate profits are near all-time highs”).
10 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1136 (2015). But see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund

2_2020.1_BARZUZA & TALLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1:104]

LONG-TERM BIAS

9/28/2020 6:30 PM

109

short-termism—and the existential threat it supposedly poses
for long-term value creation—continue to dominate both the
public discourse11 and some influential corners of academic research.12 And a host of legal and regulatory reforms to discourage short-termism and encourage management for the long
term are currently on the table at both state and federal levels, eliciting considerable debate themselves.13 At present, the
Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 550 (2016) (“We think
this assumption that managements typically engage in inefficient empire
building is out of date today and ignores the impact of major changes in
executive compensation.”). For a broader discussion see infra Section IV.B.1.
11 The Harvard Business Review recently published an Article confirming that “Yes, Short-Termism Really is a Problem,” and dedicated a whole
issue to “Managing for the Long-Term.” See Roger L. Martin, Yes, ShortTermism Really is a Problem, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 9, 2015),
https://hbr.org/2015/10/yes-short-termism-really-is-a-problem
[https://perma.cc/8Y9H-3AY6]; Managing for the Long Term, HARV. BUS.
REV., May–June 2017.
12 See, e.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 10, at 574–76 (surveying studies
that find that hedge fund activism is associated with a decline in R&D investment); see also Nickolay Gantchev et al., Governance under the Gun:
Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism (European Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
562/2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2356544
[https://perma.cc/Z2X4-CPDR] (finding that activism also affects firms that
were not directly targeted). Cf. Alon Brav et al., How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation?, 130 J. FIN. ECON. 237 (2018) [hereinafter, Brav et al., Innovation] (finding that target firms decrease investment
in R&D but improve innovation output measured in patent counts and citations); Alon Brav et al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2723 (2015)
[hereinafter Brav et al., Real Effects] (finding that target firms improve operational and allocative efficiency). John R. Graham et al., The Economic
Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 47–
50 (2005) (in a 2003 survey of 401 CFOs, most participants reported that
short-term pressures might lead their firms to forgo valuable long-term investments); Dominic Barton et al., Rising to the Challenge of ShortTermism, FCLT GLOBAL 5–7 (2016), http://www.fcltglobal.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/fclt-global-rising-to-the-challenge.pdf [http://perma.cc/7Z8P-QPJJ] (a 2015 survey of more than 1,000
top executives reveals that executives and board members believe that
growing short-term pressures result in too short investment time horizons).
13 For example, the proposed Brokaw Act would “fight against increasing short-termism in our economy by promoting transparency and strengthening oversight of activist hedge funds.” Press Release, Sen. Tammy
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kerfuffle over short-termism has attracted passionate participants on both sides, with the resulting battlefield resembling
something close to a standoff.
The ongoing stalemate might be due (at least in part) to
the failure of advocates from both sides to confront seriously
two curious paradoxes within their own debate. First, even if
episodic short-termism might conceivably emerge in specific
capital market settings, its persistence over time seems difficult to explain. Why would sophisticated market participants,
for example, deliberately and repeatedly leave money on the
table during both economic upturns and downturns, eschewing superior long-term investments in order to extract a quick
payout?14 The conventional response that hedge fund managers are incentivized through compensation towards shorttermism rings particularly hollow. Despite its current predominance, nothing requires the persistence of standard “two
and twenty” compensation package; and yet, hedge funds have
generally not backed away from it (if anything, migrating to
Baldwin, U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin Introduces Bipartisan Legislation
to Strengthen Oversight of Predatory Hedge Funds, (Aug. 31, 2017),
https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-releases/brokaw-act2017
[https://perma.cc/THJ9-NW3T]; see also Brokaw Act, S. 1744, 115th Cong.
(2017). Similarly, proposals to eliminate quarterly reporting requirements
are winning prominent champions. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, The New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG.
(Feb.
3,
2016)
[hereinafter
Lipton,
New
Paradigm],
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/03/the-new-paradigm-for-corporate-governance/ [https://perma.cc/PYN7-V7Y7] (arguing against the need
for quarterly reporting requirements); see also Strine, Who Bleeds, supra
note 5, at 1956–69 (proposing an array of policy responses to combat shorttermism, such as curbing shareholders’ proposal mechanisms). Delaware
courts have many times clarified directors’ fiduciary duties must align with
value creation under a long-term horizon. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder
Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[T]he duty of loyalty therefore mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the longterm . . . .”); In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 253
(Del. Ch. 2014); In re PLX Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9880-VCL,
2018 WL 5018535, at *41 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018); J. Travis Laster & John
Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 BUS.
LAW. 33, 49 (2014) (“The directors’ fiduciary duties . . . require that they
maximize the value of the corporation over the long term . . . .”).
14 See, e.g., Roe, supra note 8, at 987–89.
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even more short-term-oriented remuneration15). The strong
and positive market response to hedge fund activism announcements (with largely equivocal evidence about longterm effects) similarly belies the notion of short-termism as
an artifact of market pathology.16
The second puzzling aspect of the current debate concerns
the concept of long-term value creation itself, and its seemingly deified status as the consensus gold standard for corporate governance. In other words, while the clash over the existence and/or magnitude of short-term bias has raged on,
most have been willing to stipulate that long-term value maximization remains a paragon objective (quibbling only about
how best to realize it).17 It appears conventional for both sides
of the debate to characterize (or at least presume) long-term

Traditionally, hedge fund managers only charge a fee of 2% of the
assets they manage (called a “management fee”) and 20% on annual appreciation, a factor said to incentivize short-term returns (called a “performance fee”). Recently, however, these 2% and 20% figures have migrated to
1.5% and 20%—i.e., an even smaller reward on assets, and a relatively
larger reward on annual, short-term, appreciation. See Lindsay Fortado,
Hedge Fund Investors Question ‘2 and 20’ Fees, FIN. TIMES (June 6, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/291081ba-49df-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43
[https://perma.cc/P84S-7432].
16 See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance,
and Firm Performance 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008) [hereinafter, Brav et al., Firm
Performance]; see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 10 (finding that the initial
increase in value does not fade within five years). Cf. K.J. Martijn Cremers
et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Firm Valuation and Stock Returns (Dec. 19,
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693231 [https://perma.cc/8PFL-CVFW] (reporting
that targeted firms performed less well in the long-term than a matched
sample of non-targeted firms).
17 See, e.g., Strine, Fundamental Question, supra note 5, at 4–8 (describing the debate in the literature). Even many short-termist hedge fund
activists often see themselves as taking steps to reshape firms’ long-term
strategies. Many activists, for example, hold shares for several years, fight
to nominate board members, establish long term strategy committees, and
reshape long-term operational plans. See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
15
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decision making as largely unbiased,18 even as concerns over
short-termist positions sharpen.
In this Article, we attempt to gain some traction on several
of the above quandaries by introducing a novel notion of longterm bias: namely, an inclination for managers to favor inferior long-term projects over short-term alternatives that have
superior returns. While short-term bias originates primarily
from external sources such as capital market investors, longterm bias emerges internally, from managers’ assessments
about their own long-term projects. Long-term bias, we argue,
is likely to be especially salient for managerial decision makers, because (1) managers are inclined to be highly optimistic
in general; (2) they tend to discount feedback and relevant
data; and (3) they tend to receive such feedback more sporadically for long-term endeavors. Consequently, we argue, mangers’ long-term projects are particularly prone to persistent
overestimation.
Optimism bias—the proclivity of corporate managers to
overestimate the success probability of their own projects—
has already been documented extensively in the economics
and finance literature.19 But we distill a stronger implication
yet from this literature: that optimism bias is likely to be amplified, less constrained, and more influential with respect to
18 For example, while a Google Scholar search for “short-term bias” &
“corporate law” yields around 100 results, a Google Scholar search for “longterm bias” & “corporate law” yields 11 results, none of which is relevant to
corporate investment, or to the long-term bias that we discuss here. Indeed,
long-termism has long been the darling of corporate practice and policy, frequently equated with efficiency and growth. See e.g., Strine, Fundamental
Question, supra note 5, at 3 (citing sources, and stating that “[t]o build
wealth in a durable manner, corporations need to commit capital to longterm endeavors, often involving a lag time between the investment of capital and the achievement of profit, a long time during which activities like
research and development occur” (citation omitted)); William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 893, 896–97 (1997) (“[I]t can
be seen that the proper orientation of corporation law is the protection of
long-term value of capital committed indefinitely to the firm.”); Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009) (“[A] board’s decision . . . is often
rooted in distinctively corporate concerns, such as enhancing the corporation’s long term share value . . . .”).
19 See infra Section III.A (summarizing the literature).
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long-term investments. Thus, while managerial overconfidence may affect all investments initially, it will over time
lead to a disproportional survivorship of long-term investments—and hence, to an overall long-term bias in the aggregate. Our analysis of how and why long-term investments are
systematically prone to overestimation draws primarily on extensive literatures in psychology and behavioral finance, but
we also buttress it with three extended case studies from
mainstream companies (Yahoo, AOL and Navistar), where
managerial overconfidence about long-term investments appears to have thrived, only to be disrupted by hedge fund activism.
Our analytic arguments and case studies help elucidate
several factors that make long-term projects especially susceptible to overconfidence. Foremost, due to their longer trajectories, long-term investments are frequently volatile—they
could result in either an extremely high upside or an extremely low downside. An optimistic manager who overestimates the likelihood of achieving success is particularly prone
to miscalculating value in a long-term (and thus more volatile)
investment.20 We argue that amplified managerial optimism
plausibly played a role in the hiring of Marissa Mayer as Yahoo’s CEO. Mayer lacked relevant experience to lead a company of Yahoo’s size and had an inconsistent trajectory at
Google (which included a recent demotion).21 Yahoo’s board
was nonetheless won over by her ambitious long-term plan to
20 To illustrate, assume two similar investments, a short-term investment (“ST”) that could produce either 200 or 320, each with 50% probability,
and a long-term investment (“LT”), that involves higher uncertainty (high
upside and low downside) and hence could produce either 0 or 500, each
with 50% probability. ST has a higher expected value than LT (260 relative
to 250). Now assume that for each of these investments, an overconfident
manager overestimates the probability of a good scenario to be 60% (and
accordingly underestimates the probability of a bad scenario to be 40%). For
the overconfident manager the LT investment has a higher expected value
than the ST investment (300 relative to 272). The overconfident manager
thus would exhibit a long-term bias, preferring an objectively inferior LT
investment to a superior ST one. For a broader discussion see infra Section
III.A.2.
21 See NICHOLAS CARLSON, MARISSA MAYER AND THE FIGHT TO SAVE YAHOO! 174–75, 237–38 (2015).
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make Yahoo competitive with Facebook and Google in a still
emerging and unpredictable market.22 Yet, with variability
that large, this Article argues that even moderate optimism
on the board’s part could have led to a significant overestimation of Mayer’s plan for Yahoo.
Our case studies also help demonstrate how other factors
contributing to overconfidence are likely to be especially salient for long-horizon ventures. One important force exacerbating overconfidence—the so-called “illusion of control”—manifests when there is a long temporal “onramp” to strategize,
act, and overcome impediments.23 For example, Dan Ustian
(the then-CEO of Navistar) was so committed to perfecting an
unproven technology for complying with new environmental
standards that he neglected to develop a backup plan, even as
his favored technology began to show definitive signs of falling
short.24 In addition, in Mayer’s sole interview after Yahoo’s
failure, she doubled down on her belief that the only thing that
was missing was time—if she had a few more years, she reasoned, could have successfully righted Yahoo’s listing ship.25
Another factor contributing to overconfidence—the tendency
to neglect potential downstream competition—is also
22 Accordingly, the Yahoo board viewed the less risky plan proposed by
Yahoo’s internal candidate, Ross Levinsohn, as short-sighted. See infra
notes 202–05 and accompanying text.
23 See, e.g., Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 311, 320–21 (1975) (participants who had more time to
think about actions and strategies demonstrated higher overconfidence on
their chances to win a lottery). For a broader discussion see infra Section
III.A.3.
24 See infra notes 270–71 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Diana Goovaerts, Mayer’s Three-Year Plan to Turn Yahoo
into a Mobile Hitter, EE WORLD ONLINE (Mar. 15, 2016),
http://www.ecnmag.com/mayers-three-year-plan-to-turn-yahoo-into-a-mobile-hitter/ [https://perma.cc/E5GD-SH6K] (“‘I don’t think the story has yet
played out,’ Mayer said. ‘I think that when we look at this, we’ve rolled out
a new strategic plan for the company, and we can see the turnaround. A lot
of tech turnarounds do take five, six, seven years.’”); Douglas MacMillan,
Marissa Mayer Wants Three More Years to Turn Around Yahoo, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 11, 2016), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2016/03/11/marissa-mayerwants-three-more-years-to-turn-around-yahoo/
[https://perma.cc/XK3BD3T6].

2_2020.1_BARZUZA & TALLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1:104]

LONG-TERM BIAS

9/28/2020 6:30 PM

115

especially salient with respect to long-term investments, as
long-term competition is hard to predict when the initial project is inevitably vague.26 Mayer’s long-term plan for Yahoo,
for instance, which was focused on creating different apps—
most notably a search app—relied on Mayer’s skills, experience, and success while neglecting to predict how competitive
the market for apps would become.27
Finally, certain factors that ordinarily help restrain and/or
discipline overconfident managers—frequent benchmarking
exercises and interim feedback—are mechanically less routine for long-gestation projects. Benchmarking to a reference
class of projects is less likely for long-term projects, since managers typically view their own ideas as utterly unique.28 When
the finish line is far off on the horizon, regular and probative
feedback is rarely conspicuous, sporadic in arriving,29 and often too late for a manager who is prohibitively invested in the
long-term project.30 When problems arose with Navistar’s ambitious Exhaust Gas Recirculation (“EGR”) technology, for example, CEO Ustian practically quarantined his office away
from company engineers and dismissed employees who were
26

On the relationship of vagueness to overconfidence see infra Section

III.B.1.
See CARLSON, supra note 21, at 285–86, 305.
For the importance of using a reference class to restrain overconfidence, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Intuitive Prediction: Biases
and Corrective Procedures, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES, 414 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter Kahneman
& Tversky, Intuitive Prediction]; Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives’ Decisions, HARV.
BUS. REV., July 2003, at 56 [hereinafter Lovallo & Kahneman, Delusions];
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 245–254 (2011) [hereinafter
KAHNEMAN, THINKING]. For a broader discussion of restrains to overconfidence in long-term projects see infra Section III.B.
29 See, e.g., Phebo D. Wibbens & Nicolaj Siggelkow, Introducing LIVA
to Measure Long‐Term Firm Performance, STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1 (2020)
(developing a long-term investment performance measure that is defined
only ex post).
30 See, e.g., Tali Sharot et al., How Unrealistic Optimism is Maintained
in the Face of Reality, 14 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1475, 1475–78 (2011) (finding asymmetric updating of beliefs in light of new information); Ziva Kunda,
The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990) (arguing
that motivation affects reasoning).
27
28
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vocally skeptical.31 And in “probably the most intense moment
you'll ever hear during a workplace conference call,” Tim Armstrong, AOL’s CEO (who eventually had to cut bait on his own
long-term project called Patch), impulsively fired an employee
in front of the entire division.32 In a recent retrospective interview, Armstrong identified his coddling of Patch as his main
misstep at AOL, laying particular blame on his pattern of ignoring incoming feedback and data about the project.33
To the extent that our account of long-term managerial
bias is persuasive, it holds several implications for corporate
law and policy. First, it suggests managers are, if left to their
own devices, inclined to overinvest in long-term projects. As a
result, external short-term pressures may have some positive
ramifications.34 Activist hedge funds no doubt emphasize (and
may even overemphasize) short-term performance, resulting
in excess demand for immediate payouts. But irrespective of
See discussion infra Section III.C.3.
Nicholas Carlson, LEAKED AUDIO: Listen to AOL CEO Tim Armstrong Fire a Patch Employee in Front of 1,000 Coworkers, BUS. INSIDER
(Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/leaked-audio-listen-to-aolceo-tim-armstrong-fire-a-patch-employee-snapping-a-photo-2013-8
[https://perma.cc/AJ5X-LGPB].
33 Recode Staff, Full Transcript: Oath CEO Tim Armstrong on Recode
Media,
RECODE
(Sept.
3,
2017),
https://www.recode.net/2017/9/3/16243970/transcript-oath-ceo-tim-armstrong-aol-patchverizon-yahoo-recode-media [https://perma.cc/ME86-MWP5] (“The judgment changed and the mistake I made was going exactly what you said, too
bullish down a path without making sure those early positive metrics were
actually coming true in all the other markets.”).
34 So far, the conventional wisdom has dismissed arguments of overinvestments. Empire building, an agency-costs theory of overinvestment, was
considered dated, since equity compensation packages better aligned managers’ incentives with firm value. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 10, at 593–
94. Overconfidence drives the long-termist approach. Therefore, incentivebased compensation encourages rather than discourages it. Overconfident
managers who genuinely but mistakenly believe in the desirability of these
investments, are encouraged to invest more if their compensation is tied to
firm value. See, e.g., Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661, 2696 (2005) [hereinafter,
Malmendier & Tate, Investment] (“Specifically, standard incentives such as
stock- and option-based compensation are unlikely to mitigate the detrimental effects of managerial overconfidence.”).
31
32
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motivation, such short-termism may represent an efficient
counter-ballast against at least certain forms of long-termist
overinvestment.
Second, short-term pressure to unlock cash may increase
the frequency of external feedback and benchmarking for
overconfident managers, since it requires them to draw more
regularly on external sources to finance their projects. It is
well known that overconfidence tends to feed on a surplus of
internal funds (e.g., retained earnings) to underwrite projects.35 If overconfident managers are required to raise capital
externally (because activists keep capital margins thin), they
will have to “pitch” (and “re-pitch”) their ideas more frequently to outside capital providers.36
Third, our analysis bears on ongoing reform proposals to
re-shape doctrines, laws and regulations in order to protect
long-termist management from short-term demands. The
Brokaw Act, for example, which would constrain hedge fund
activists through a variety of disclosure and liability
measures, was reintroduced on August 31, 2017.37 Several
35 See Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 34, at 2661, 2663
(finding that overconfident CEOs “overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing”
and that this “sensitivity of investment to cash flow is strongest for CEOs
of equity-dependent firms, for whom perceived financing constraints are
most binding”); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20,
20 (2008) [hereinafter Malmendier & Tate, Acquisitions] (finding that overconfident CEOs are likely to make value destroying acquisitions, and the
effect is stronger “if they have access to internal financing”). In addition, in
all the three case studies that this Article discusses—namely, Yahoo, AOL
& Navistar—the firms were generating significant cash flow, which was
used to finance the long-term investments discussed. See discussion infra
Section III.C.
36 Indeed, a recent study finds that new equity issues wash out half of
firms’ payouts to shareholders. See Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang,
Short-Termism and Capital Flows, 8 REV. CORP. FIN. STUD. 207, 217–19
(2019). See also Bebchuk et al., supra note 10, at 1136 (arguing that in the
absence of short-term pressures “management might refrain from taking
actions that would reduce the size of the empire under its control or the
freedom to pursue projects without the discipline generated by having to
raise outside financing”).
37 See Brokaw Act, S. 1744, 115th Cong. (2017).
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opponents of hedge fund activism have also called for elimination of quarterly reporting requirements (generating recent
presidential and regulatory attention).38 And, several recent
decisions by Delaware courts have held that a director nominee of a short-term investor or hedge find might breach their
fiduciary duties by pursuing strategies that appear to disregard the firm’s long-term equity value.39 Our analysis counsels some degree of caution in pursuing these legal and regulatory interventions that are predicated largely on insulating
corporate decision making from the forces short-termism. If
such interventions do not account for the possibility of valuereducing long-termism too, the results could miss their mark
by a wide margin.40
Fourth, our analysis has implications for takeover law,
such as Delaware’s well-known approach that permits managers to “just say no” to a hostile acquirer. As students of corporate law are well aware, public company managers frequently tend to spurn unsolicited acquisition offers
(purportedly made by short-termist corporate raiders), asserting that the premium offered (frequently 30% to 50% above
the prevailing market price)41 undershoots the “real” fundamental value of the company’s long-term prospects.42 Delaware courts accord considerable deference to such resistance,
38 See, e.g., Lipton, New Paradigm, supra note 13 (calling for the elimination of quarterly reporting requirements).
39 See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013);
In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 253 (Del. Ch.
2014); In re PLX Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9880-VCL, 2018 WL
5018535, at *41 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018).
40 We note that thus far, the Delaware courts appear to be exercising
this caution implicitly. In the recent Trados and PLX decisions, for example,
Vice Chancellor Laster held that hedge fund nominee directors violated
their fiduciary duties by engineering early exits, but the court then also determined the damages to be effectively zero. See In re Trados Inc., 73 A.3d
at 56–58, 78; In re PLX Tech. Inc., 2018 WL 5018535, at *38–47, *50–56.
41 Stefano Rossi & Paolo F. Volpin, Cross-Country Determinants of
Mergers and Acquisitions, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 277, 282 tbl.2 (2004).
42 See Nitzan Shilon, Putting Directors' Money Where Their Mouths
Are: A New Approach to Improving Corporate Takeover Dynamics, 2017
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 511, 536, 542–47 (2017).
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maintaining that so long as the target board’s assessment is
genuine and informed, it enjoys wide latitude to stiff-arm an
outside bid.43 If, however, managerial assessments of longterm value are biased, judicial deference may not always be
categorically justified.
Finally, our argument also has implications for assessing
the new phenomenon of dual-class IPOs.44 Despite a potential
discount to the IPO price, overconfident managers, who believe that the market is likely to undervalue their long-term
project, may embrace a dual-class structure to protect their
projects from subsequent shareholder revolts.45 While our
strong intuition is to leave such capital-structure decisions up
to the promoters (who must internalize the discount, after all),
long-termism may well imply that at least some fraction of
dual-class structures are unwise or inefficient.46
We flag three important caveats to our analysis before proceeding. First, much of our constructive argument marshals
insights and findings from behavioral finance and psychology,
positing how certain non-rational biases may distort managerial decision making. We are mindful that behavioral approaches may not be appropriate in all circumstances, and—
when used too immodestly—fall prey to the vice of explaining
too much (providing a metaphorical Swiss Army knife of biases that can rationalize almost anything).47 That said, behavioral arguments seem particularly apt in assessing the instant
43 See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154–55
(Del. 1989).
44 See discussion infra Section IV.C.1.
45 Cf. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560 (2016) (arguing that founders sometimes
rightly maintain control in order to pursue value enhancing investments
with idiosyncratic vision).
46 At the same time, we do not rule out the possibility that in some
cases this manager rightly believes in her long-term project, while activists
mistakenly undervalue her unique vision. See id. at 565–67 (arguing that
investors might undervalue, and even frustrate, idiosyncratic, value enhancing investments).
47 See, e.g., Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics,
and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1560 (1998); Ryan Bubb & Richard H.
Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1593, 1633 (2014).
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debate, since many (if not most) coherent criticisms of shorttermism similarly draw on behavioral theories, rejecting an
assumption of perfectly rational capital markets. Our contribution, then, is not as much to introduce behavioral theory
into the debate as it is to point out its relevance on both sides.
Second, while our focus here is on making the case that
long-term bias exists and distorts corporate decision making,
we do not aspire to displace or refute the prevailing narrative
about the dangers of short-term bias. Quite to the contrary, a
key puzzle surrounding short-termism—its stubborn persistence over time—becomes far less paradoxical when shorttermism is viewed as an institutional “chaperone” to longtermism.48 Because the two biases affect managers in opposing directions, they can tend to counteract one another’s most
glaring shortcomings. Once one relaxes utopian assumptions
about the sacrosanctity of long-term value, persistent and durable short-termism among sophisticated investors becomes
both more plausible and symbiotic. Viewed this way, longterm bias plays the yin to short-termism’s yang.49
Finally, even if one accepts our constructive argument, it
concededly comes straight out of the “shareholder primacy”
handbook, equating firm welfare to shareholder value. While
this normative frame is well established in doctrine, the relative merits of long-term versus short-term management could
easily change when reckoned against alternative desiderata.
One important and re-emerging dialogue within corporate law
concerns the extent to which managers do (or should) give decisional weight to a broader set of constituencies beyond stockholders. Creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, and surrounding communities may also have a stake in company
decisions, yet are rarely accorded the same primacy under corporate law that shareholders receive. And, it seems plausible
48 See Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Short-Termism and LongTermism 21–41 (Columbia Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 526, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2731814 [https://perma.cc/GT7H-U4RD] (modeling short-term bias’ interactions with long-term bias).
49 For an analysis of the relationship between biases’ costs and biases’
survivorship over time see Xavier Gabaix, A Sparsity-Based Model of
Bounded Rationality, 129 Q. J. ECON. 1661 (2014).
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that many overconfident long-term strategies also might bestow collateral benefits on non-shareholder constituencies
(e.g., aggressive R&D programs that increase the company’s
workforce).50 Thus, even if our arguments are correct, longterm value maximization could still emerge attractive precisely because it endows managers with the equanimity to
pursue strategies that are both overconfidently sanguine and
stakeholder friendly. While we welcome this dialogue, we also
submit that long-term biases may afflict managerial judgment
with respect to other stakeholders, further multiplying this
effect. Moreover, a host of alternative mechanisms already exist for ensuring stakeholder-friendly governance, including
public benefit corporate structures,51 alternative financing arrangements,52 tax incentives,53 and top-down regulation.54
Some of these alternatives could well outflank managerial
long-termism in harmonizing the interests of multiple stakeholders. At the very least, these comparisons deserve to be
made transparently, and upon equal footing.
Our analysis unfolds as follows. Part II discusses the current debate surrounding short-termism, along with its curious
See Coffee & Palia, supra note 10, at 47–54.
See Jesse Finfrock & Eric Talley, Social Entrepreneurship and Uncorporations, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1867, 1871–73 (2014).
52 See generally Jeffrey D. Sachs et al., Importance of Green Finance
for Achieving Sustainable Development Goals and Energy Security, in HANDBOOK OF GREEN FINANCE 8–11 (Jeffrey Sachs et al. eds., 2019).
53 See, e.g., Kee-Hong Bae et al., Employee Treatment and Firm Leverage: A Test of the Stakeholder Theory of Capital Structure, 100 J. FIN. ECON.
130 (2011) (finding a systematic relationship between corporate leverage
and employee satisfaction, and positing that tax incentives that favor high
leverage ratios may impair employee welfare).
54 See Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s proposed Accountable Capitalism Act,
S. 3448, 115th Cong. (2018), which would federalize all U.S. corporations
with over $1 billion in annual revenue, and mandate that not less than 40%
of the directors of a U.S. corporation be elected by employees, requiring directors to consider the interests of all corporate stakeholders. Also note Sen.
Chuck Schumer and Sen. Bernie Sanders’ recent proposal to prohibit share
buybacks unless a corporation has satisfied minimal employee wage and
benefit requirements. See Chuck Schumer & Bernie Sanders, Schumer and
Sanders: Limit Corporate Stock Buybacks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/opinion/chuck-schumer-bernie-sanders.html [https://perma.cc/H4KZ-J97X].
50
51
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limitations. Sections III.A. & III.B. analyze the overconfidence
literature and argue that based on experimental evidence, empirical data and theory, managerial overconfidence should
lead to a long-term bias. Section III.C moves to discuss the
three illustrative case studies—Yahoo, AOL & Navistar—
where managers’ overly rosy assessments of long-term projects were arguably interrupted by activist hedge funds. Part
IV discusses the legal and business implications of our argument. Part V concludes.

II. SHORT-TERMISM: THE STANDARD (&
PARADOXICAL) ACCOUNT
It takes little more than a glancing perusal of the business
press to confirm that short-termism has become a defining
cause célèbre of corporate America.55 According to the conventional account,56 managers of public companies face constant
pressures—most notably from hedge fund activists—to meet
quarterly earnings expectations, enhance liquidity, and pay
out immediate returns, even if doing so sacrifices superior
long-term investment opportunities and growth.57 By appearance, such charges have some merit: as is well known, activists often pressure firms to increase dividend distribution and
share repurchases, cut investments, and promote spinoffs and
sales. Moreover, shortly after executing such strategies, activists frequently unwind their positions, leaving other shareholders behind to bear the long-term costs that their purportedly myopic strategies have wrought. Augmenting and
backstopping activists’ incentives, the argument goes, is hard
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
As noted above, the popular business press has lamented short
termism since at least the early 1980s, then usually in the guise of leveraged
buyouts and corporate raiders. See Hayes & Abernathy, supra note 3, at 70.
Here we confine description to the most recent incarnation of commentators’
short termism criticisms.
57 See, e.g., CONFERENCE BD., IS SHORT-TERM BEHAVIOR JEOPARDIZING
THE
FUTURE
PROSPERITY
OF
BUSINESS?,
1
(2015),
https://www.wlrk.com/docs/IsShortTermBehaviorJeopardizingTheFutureProsperityOfBusiness_CEOStrategicImplications.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6JKD-7WCP].
55
56
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economics: the standard hedge fund manager’s compensation
structure—2% on assets, but a staggering 20% on the appreciation of their portfolio—provides a substantial reward for
hitting a short-term home run, even as it eschews the less sexy
(if still profitable) path of steady growth.58 In addition, hedge
funds investors typically are generally able to pull their
money out of the fund within six months to two years, and
they are known to threaten to do so whenever the fund manager cannot demonstrate short-term performance and gains.59
Accordingly, several studies have shown that hedge funds can
(and do) face significant liquidity crises through investor demands.60 The resulting landscape overdetermines short-term
bias, the argument goes, resulting in significant damage that
includes a documented decline in firms’ R&D investments and
capital expenditures due to activist pressures.61 Furthermore,
the purportedly deleterious effects of activism reach far beyond the specific firms targeted—they easily “go viral” as
other managers grope to implement short-termist strategies
themselves, desperately hoping to preempt activism within
their own ranks.62 Adding to the pressure from activists, quarterly reporting requirements cast a frequent, mandatory, and
often unflattering spotlight on short-term performance.63
Management surveys confirm that perceived short-term

See, e.g., Strine, Who Bleeds, supra note 5, at 1893–94.
See id. at 1893 (“A useful contrast is private equity’s typical five- to
ten-year lock-up.”); Coffee & Palia, supra note 10, at 573.
60 See, e.g., Itzhak Ben-David et al., Hedge Fund Stock Trading in the
Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 5 (2012) (finding that
“following poor past performance, hedge fund investors withdraw almost
three times more capital as do mutual fund investors”).
61 See, e.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 10, at 574–77 (surveying studies
that find that hedge fund activism is associated with a decline in R&D investment); but see Brav et al., Innovation, supra note 12 (finding that target
firms decrease investment in R&D but improve innovation output measured
in patent counts and citations); Brav et al., Real Effects, supra note 12, at
2734–46 (finding that target firms improve operational and allocative efficiency).
62 See Gantchev et al., supra note 12.
63 See, e.g., Lipton, New Paradigm, supra note 13.
58
59
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pressures such as those described above have a significant
limiting effect on long-term investments.64
The concern that short-term bias limits long-term investment and growth has become widespread, significant, and
highly influential. Judges, policymakers, investors, lawyers,
and managers, all share this concern and a sense of urgency
to act to limit short-termism. In 2010, Judge Leo Strine, former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, warned
that “there is a danger that activist stockholders will make
proposals motivated by interests other than maximizing the
long-term, sustainable profitability of the corporation.”65 More
recently, Strine reiterated that “changes in corporate behavior
influenced by stock market forces such as hedge fund activism: a short-term increase in productivity and stock price at
the expense of long-term reinvestment and wage growth will
likely harm the overall ‘portfolio’ of the human investor.”66
Larry Fink, Chair and CEO of Blackrock—a significant investment fund—similarly stated that “[t]he effects of the
short-termism phenomenon are troubling . . . more and more
corporate leaders have responded with actions that can deliver immediate returns to shareholders, such as buybacks or
dividend increases, while underinvesting in innovation,
skilled workforces or essential capital expenditures necessary
to sustain long-term growth.”67
Similarly, the preeminent corporate lawyer Martin Lipton
has been notably vocal about the risks of short-termism. In a
recent publication Lipton argued that “[t]his pervasive shorttermism is eroding the overall economy and putting our nation at a major competitive disadvantage.”68 Lipton has harsh

64 See Graham et al., supra note 12, at 47–50; Barton et al., supra note
12, at 6–9.
65 Strine, Fundamental Question, supra note 5, at 8.
66 Strine, Who Bleeds, supra note 5, at 1885.
67 Letter from Laurence D. Fink, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer,
Blackrock, to Blackrock Shareholders (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20150331BlackRock.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/2JRX-WZLZ].
68 Lipton, supra note 7.
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words for activists’ “misuse of shareholder power,”69 claiming
it “can only be considered a form of extortion.”70 Similarly, the
Conference Board, a leading business research organization,
has warned about the risks of short-termism in a publication
titled Is Short-Term Behavior Jeopardizing the Future Prosperity of Business?71
Amid this choir of prominent critics, a dissonant countermelody has emerged. Several commentators (including both
academics and hedge funds) openly question the magnitude
(and direction) of short-termism concerns along multiple
fronts.72 Some have argued, for example, that complaints
about short-term bias are little more than a smoke screen for
agency costs.73 According to this argument, managerial empire building, inattentiveness, and internal diversification (all
contrary to the interests of shareholders) may lead managers
to keep their organizations too large, too diversified, and unnecessarily illiquid.74 Moreover, several empirical studies
have shown that activist interventions are associated with
positive and significant market responses in stock prices of
around 5% on average.75 Such announcement returns would
be consistent with long-term value destruction only if capital
markets made significant and systematic errors in pricing securities by disregarding the longer term implications of activist intervention (a possibility that some entertain, at least episodically).76 In addition, the average holding period for hedge
fund activists appears to be close to two years (during which

69 Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Feb. 26, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/ 26/ bite-the-applepoison-the-apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy
[https://perma.cc/B4HQ-BSNK].
70 Lipton, supra note 6.
71 CONFERENCE BD., supra note 57.
72 See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 9.
73 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 10, at 1136.
74 Id.
75 See Brav et al., Firm Performance, supra note 16, at 1756 (surveying
these studies).
76 See Roe, supra note 8, at 993–96.
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they often have board representation)77, seemingly at odds
with the “quick round trip” narrative the conventional theory
offers.78 And, most modern activism appears intimately related to playing an ongoing role in governance through board
seats, a phenomenon historically associated with “long-term”
activism.79

See Ian D. Gow et al., Activist Directors: Determinants and Consequences (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-120, 2014).
78 See Brav et al., Firm Performance, supra note 16, at 1748–49.
79 In 2016, for example, activists targeted 79 companies, winning 145
board seats. See LAZARD, 2017 ACTIVISM YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2018),
https://www.lazard.com/media/450414/lazards-review-of-shareholder-activism-q4-2017pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRQ8-5KWG]. The vast majority of
these seats were won through settlements with the targeted board. Id. Their
terms rarely contain explicit requirements to distribute capital, pay dividends, sell the company, replace the CEO, or any other specific demand that
is typically attributed to hedge fund activism. See Alon Brav et al., Dancing
with Activists 44 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 906, 2019); John C. Coffee Jr. et al., Activists Directors
and Agency Costs: What Happens When an Activist Director Goes on the
Board?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 381, 396–97 (2019).The Yahoo settlement, for
example, required the establishment of a strategic committee. See Yahoo!
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 10.1 at 3–4 (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/000119312516558861/d185516dex101.htm
[https://perma.cc/A48R-W69C]. In the Darden/Olive Garden proxy fight, activist investor Starboard Value prepared a long and detailed report about
the long table wait at restaurants and other suggested improvements. See
STARBOARD VALUE, TRANSFORMING DARDEN RESTAURANTS 10 (2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/940944/000092189514002031/ex991dfan14a06297125_091114.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6YSD-2TCD]. Similarly, the recent campaign of Nelson
Peltz for a Proctor & Gamble board seat included significant proposals for
operational improvements. See The Proctor & Gamble Co., Definitive Proxy
Statement (Schedule 14A), at 1–2 (Aug. 16, 2017). Thus, the skeptics have
rejoined, while there is no doubt that hedge fund intervention frequently is
geared around extracting short-term value, there are examples where such
interventions were also directed at improving the firm long-term strategy,
operational changes, and managerial advice. See Strine, Who Bleeds, supra
note 5, at 1908 (“[T]here is some emerging evidence suggesting that activist
hedge funds prepared to take a long-term position and work as fiduciaries
to improve the performance of the companies they target achieve a better
market reaction.”); see also C.N.V. Krishnan et al., The Second Wave of
77
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The battle lines around activism and short-termism are
now well established, and they have remained approximately
stationary for roughly a decade. By our lights, the skirmish
has devolved into something of a Remarquian standoff.80 The
lack of a definitive victor, however, has not diluted the impression among many prominent commentators that shorttermism remains pervasive and threatening. Indeed, such
concerns have become sufficiently influential that numerous
reforms to discourage short-termism in order to protect and
vindicate long term value are currently on the table. The proposed Brokaw Act, for example, “would fight against increasing short-termism in our economy by promoting transparency
and strengthening oversight of activist hedge funds.”81 Similarly, within securities law there has been a growing movement afoot in recent years to relax and/or eliminate other potential sources of mandatory short-term benchmarking, such
as the half-century-old requirement82 of quarterly financial
reporting.83 These calls eventually spurred President Trump
to order (well, to tweet, actually)84 that the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) should investigate whether it
should revert to semi-annual or annual reporting instead.85
Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise,
40 J. CORP. FIN. 296 (2016).
80 See generally ERICH MARIA REMARQUE, ALL QUIET ON THE WESTERN
FRONT (A.W. Wheen, trans., Ballantine Publ’g Grp. 1982) (1928).
81 See Sen. Tammy Baldwin, supra note 13; see also Brokaw Act, S.
1744, 115th Cong. (2017).
82 See Form 10-Q For Disclosure of Financial Information,, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 34-8683, 35 Fed. Reg. 14,239, 14,239 (proposed
Sept. 10, 1969) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 249); Quarterly Reporting
Form, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-9004, 35 Fed. Reg. 17,537,
17,537–38 (Oct. 28, 1970) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 249).
83 See, e.g., Lipton, New Paradigm, supra note 13 (calling for the elimination of quarterly reporting requirements); see also Strine, Who Bleeds,
supra note 5, at 1956–69 (proposing an array of policy responses, i.e., curbing shareholders’ proposal mechanism).
84 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 17, 2018,
4:30
AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1030416679069777921 [https://perma.cc/AGJ6-7PNW].
85 See e.g., Dave Michaels et al., Trump Asks SEC to Study Six-Month
Reporting for Public Companies, WALL. ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2018),
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And in late 2018, the SEC obliged, issuing a notice for public
comment on the question of whether the “existing periodic reporting system . . . foster[s] an inefficient outlook among registrants and market participants by focusing on short-term results.” 86
But perhaps the most salient move for students of corporate law has occurred in the courts, which have themselves
begun to redefine directors’ fiduciary duties to align with a
long-termist brand of shareholder maximization.87 Consider,
for example, the 2013 Delaware case involving the acquisition
of Trados Inc., a venture-capital-backed software start-up that
had performed well enough to stay alive, but not well enough
to meet the expectations of the venture capital funds underwriting it.88 When a buyer emerged willing to acquire the company for (approximately) the value of the VCs’ liquidation
claim (via their preferred shares), an inter-shareholder battle
royale ensued where preferred shareholders wished to cash
out immediately while common shareholders—who would receive no consideration for the transaction—wished to maintain the status quo.89 The preferreds (who held the majority of
voting power and director seats) managed to cram down the
deal, and the former common shareholders later sued, claiming that the preferreds’ board nominees abrogated their fiduciary duties by failing to accord sufficient weight to the interests of the common shareholders, who were “permanent
capital” at the firm.90
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-directs-sec-to-study-six-month-reporting-for-public-companies-1534507058 [https://perma.cc/VPS6-EXVZ].
86 See Request for Comment on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports, 83 Fed. Reg. 65,601, 65,601 (proposed Dec. 18, 2018) (to be codified at
C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 239, 240, 243, and 249).
87 See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(“[T]he duty of loyalty therefore mandates that directors maximize the value
of the corporation over the long-term . . . .”); In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 80–83 (Del. Ch. 2014); Laster & Zeberkiewicz, supra note 13, at 49. (“The directors’ fiduciary duties . . . require that they
maximize the value of the corporation over the long term . . . .”).
88 In re Trados Inc., 73 A.3d at 20.
89 Id. at 28–32.
90 Id. at 32–34.
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Vice Chancellor Laster’s well-cited 2013 trial opinion In re
Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation (“Trados”) established a
template that would be followed many times thereafter. In it,
Laster held that the rigorous entire fairness standard of review would apply to the board’s process and decision to favor
one group of shareholders over another. 91 Applying this standard, the Vice Chancellor found that the board failed to demonstrate procedural fairness, since their deliberations never seriously gave due weight to the welfare of the common
shareholders in negotiating the acquisition.92 At the same
time, however, Laster substantially defanged the unfair process finding, holding that the fair price for common shareholders was zero.93 While one could certainly quibble with the finding that the common stock (which effectively represented an
“at the money call option” on the firm) had no economic value
whatsoever, the more durable effect of Trados is that it established a template for adjudicating fiduciary duty cases where
different classes are pitted against one another. In such situations, the long-term position represented by “permanent capital” (usually the common shareholders) gets a decided thumb
on the scale.
Vice Chancellor Laster doubled down on this view in the
2017 opinion Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding

91
92
93

Id. at 43.
Id. at 56–65.
Specifically, Laster’s opinion states:
I believe that Trados would not be able to grow at a rate that
would yield value for the common. Trados likely could selffund, avoid bankruptcy, and continue operating, but it did
not have a realistic chance of generating a sufficient return
to escape the gravitational pull of the large liquidation preference and cumulative dividend. . . . In light of this reality,
the directors breached no duty to the common stock by
agreeing to a Merger in which the common stock received
nothing. The common stock had no economic value before
the Merger, and the common stockholders received in the
Merger the substantial equivalent in value of what they had
before.

Id. at 77–78.
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Corp.94 This case was substantially similar to Trados (pitting
short-termist preferreds who favored exit against common
shareholders who favored the status quo), but here the preferred shareholders induced the board to allow them to utilize
a redemption right that effectively forced an exit.95 In denying
a motion to dismiss, the Vice Chancellor once again explicitly
prioritized long-term investors (conceived as common shareholders) in the fiduciary-duty space as the holders of permanent capital. Recognizing the difficulty in applying shareholder primacy when there are multiple forms of equity,
Laster once again deferred to common stockholders, writing:
In a world with many types of stock—preferred stock,
tracking stock, . . . plain vanilla common stock, etc. . .
. the question naturally arises: which stockholders? . .
. Equity capital, by default, is permanent capital. In
terms of the standard, of conduct, therefore, the fiduciary relationship requires that the directors act prudently, loyally, and in good faith to maximize the
value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of the providers of presumptively permanent equity capital, as warranted for an entity with a presumptively perpetual life in which the residual
claimants have locked in their investment. . . . [I]t generally ‘will be the duty of the board, where discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests
of common stock—as the good faith judgment of the
board sees them to be—to the interests created by the
special rights, preferences, etc., of preferred stock.’ 96

The long-termist view of fiduciary duties (identified with
the interests of common shareholders) has emerged many
times since, including the recent 2018 case of In re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders Litigation, which involved a shareholder challenge to the sale of PLX (a semiconductor producer)
in a strategic transaction with Avago, a designer and supplier

Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108-VCL,
2017 WL 1437308, at *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2017).
95 Id. at *1–3.
96 Id. at *17–18, *22 (internal citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
94
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of semiconductors.97 The plaintiffs claimed that the transaction was the result of a secret plan by an activist hedge fund
(Potomac) and its manager (Singer) who wanted to make a
quick profit on an investment in the company.98 Singer was
already a PLX director, having gained a board seat through a
successful proxy contest.99 The plaintiffs claimed that Singer
had secretly conspired to reach a sale price with an unannounced bidder (Avago), going so far as to work with an investment bank to engineer discounted-cash-flow valuations
justifying the agreed upon price.100 In evaluating the proposal
once it was finally made, the board had no knowledge of
Singer’s prior involvement and only limited access to the massaged valuation metrics.101 Also unaware of Singer’s dealings,
a majority of shareholders approved the transaction.102
After several defendants either settled or were dismissed
from the suit, the key surviving issue in the case concerned
the plaintiffs’ aiding-and-abetting claim against Singer and
Potomac.103 Much of Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion concentrated on a predicate element of that claim: the underlying
breach of fiduciary duty by the board. Having first held that
the shareholder vote approving the deal had no “cleansing” effect because of several material non-disclosures about Singer’s
prior secret dealings, the court found a breach of fiduciary
duty that turned critically on short-termist motives:
The record in this case convinces me that Singer and
Potomac had a divergent interest in achieving quick
profits by orchestrating a near-term sale at PLX. During their activist campaign and subsequent proxy contest, Singer and Potomac argued vehemently that PLX
should be sold quickly. Singer’s thesis for investing in
PLX depended entirely on a short-term sale to the
97 See In re PLX Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig. No. 9880-VCL, 2018 WL
5018535 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018).
98 Id. at *4–5.
99 Id. at *1.
100 Id. at *1–5.
101 Id. at *4.
102 Id. at *3.
103 Id. at *4–5.
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other bidder who emerged during the go-shop period
for the IDT transaction. He never prepared any valuation or other analysis of the fundamental value of
PLX. He lacked any ideas for generating value at PLX
other than to sell it. . . . Taken as a whole, this evidence suggests that Potomac and Singer undermined
the Board’s process and led the Board into a deal that
it otherwise would not have approved. . . . [B]y withholding this information from the rest of the Board,
Singer breached his fiduciary duty and induced the
other directors to breach theirs. 104

Interestingly, like in his Trados opinion, Vice Chancellor
Laster proceeded to defang much of the foregoing analysis by
holding the overall deal price constituted a “fair” value of the
company.105 As in Trados, this final move seems somewhat curious, as it involves a “quasi-appraisal” approach to damages
rather than a “rescissory” approach, which often would follow
a successful claim by a plaintiff that a sale would/should never
have taken place. Thus, while the opinion ups the ante on
characterizing short-termist behavior as inconsistent with fiduciary duties, it largely dampens the consequences of such a
finding through its holding as to the remedy. Furthermore,
since the court focuses specifically on Singer’s divergent interests, the decision does not limit those activists who focus on
improving long-term strategies (and curbing long term bias).
Indeed, the court is explicit that mere association with an activist hedge fund is not by itself an indication of a breach of
directors’ duties.106
From the brief review above, it seems clear that the Delaware courts have begun to migrate towards a clear recognition
of long-term equity value as the sine qua non of fiduciary duties. They have thus far done so, however, with a decidedly
Id. at *42, *47.
Id. at *5.
106 Id. at *42 (“It is not enough for a plaintiff simply ‘to argue in the
abstract that a particular director has a conflict of interest because she is
affiliated with a particular type of institution’ that has particular incentives
or pursues a particular strategy. At trial, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the director harbored a divergent interest.”).
104
105
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light touch, by fashioning creative doctrinal analyses and/or
remedies that dampen the most severe consequences of a
breach through short-term-oriented decisions. Even so, these
recent doctrinal events represent a clear early signal that the
debate over short-termism—while still arguably locked in a
stalemate among many academics—has begun to move the judicial needle in important ways.
It is unlikely that any single Article (including ours) can
definitively resolve the debate over short-termism. Nevertheless, we aspire to help reassess it, motivated by two aspects of
the debate that we find paradoxical. First, conventional wisdom on both sides seems to presuppose the sacrosanctity of
unalloyed long-term value maximization. That is, the goal of
long-term value is unassailable and uncontroversial (even as
the combatants bicker about whether short term pressures
preempt or catalyze it). Throughout, however, and in sharp
contrast to the short-term bias debate, long-term value has
remained the darling of nearly all sides of the debate in corporate practice and policy, frequently equated with efficiency,
optimality and growth.107 But is it true that long-termism
could never be excessive, biased, or skewed? In our view, the
received debate pays little to no attention to this question. Has
this assumption even been tested or thought through carefully? Are there no reasons why managers might prefer inferior long-term investments over superior short-term gains?
Second, assuming arguendo that activists fall prey continually and perpetually to short-term biases, then it must be the
case that they leave significant value on the table. Why they
would do so is a mystery. Why would sophisticated and financially motivated hedge fund managers operating in a decidedly competitive market chase only limited short-term gains,
if (through a modicum of patience) they could derive substantially higher returns by waiting?108 And why would they continue to do so for over a decade, across both economic booms
and busts? Activists have it within their power to correct their
own biases, by (for instance) choosing a compensation structure that offers lower rewards for short-term performance.
107
108

See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
See Roe, supra note 8, at 987.

2_2020.1_BARZUZA & TALLEY (DO NOT DELTE)

134

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

9/28/2020 6:30 PM

[Vol. 2020

Strikingly, however, not only have hedge funds not moved in
this direction, but they are now doing the opposite—shifting
from the common 2% and 20%, to 1.5% and 20%—rewarding
fund managers even less on assets, and relatively more on
short-term appreciation.109 To be sure, long term compensation would not necessarily alleviate short-termist pressure
from hedge fund investors, who often redeem their investment
if short-term performance is weak.110 Indeed, hedge funds suffered high rates of liquidation during the last financial crisis.111 But here still, many investors are also sophisticated and
should be sensitive to long-term value; it seems curious that
funds would not develop tools to commit to long-term gains, or
signal the value of long-term investment to their investors.112
All told, even if short termism could erupt episodically, why
should it persist for so long in capital markets, among supposedly sophisticated professionals, and across economic booms
and busts alike?
As the following Parts will argue, these two puzzles (and
their possible resolution) may well be intertwined. In contrast
to conventional wisdom, we will advance the thesis that longtermism need not be perfect. Rather, similar to short-term
bias, managing for the long term may sometimes exhibit its
own biases. Long-term projects, we argue below, are especially
susceptible to managerial overconfidence, and as a result, systematic overestimation.113 Since managers disproportionally
overestimate the expected value of their long-term projects,
they skew their own decisions away from objectively superior
See Lindsay Fortado, Hedge Fund Investors Question ‘2 and 20’
Fees, FIN. TIMES (June 6, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/291081ba-49df11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43 [https://perma.cc/VP5U-YRU6].
110 See, e.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 10, at 573.
111 See Ben-David et al., supra note 60, at 2–4.
112 See Roe, supra note 8, at 987–89. But see Jeremy C. Stein, Why Are
Most Funds Open-End? Competition and the Limits of Arbitrage, 120 Q. J.
ECON. 247, 248 (2005) (showing how, under asymmetric information, fund
managers signal their quality to investors by keeping their funds open for
withdrawal); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage,
52 J. FIN. 35, 49–51 (1997) (showing how fund managers might skip profitable long-term investments to demonstrate short-success to their investors).
113 See infra Part III.
109
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short-term investments. And when such a phenomenon holds,
short-termism is not only plausible, but it can become an indispensable chaperone to long-termism, effectively negating
its most deleterious effects and explaining the forgoing puzzles with new-found parsimony.

III. A NEW APPROACH: THE OVERLOOKED LONGTERM BIAS
This Part challenges the assumption that long-termism is
essentially bias free. Rather, it will argue that similar to
short-term bias, long-term frames can and have catalyzed a
different type of bias in managers’ decisions. Long-term projects, we will argue, are prone to overconfidence bias, and in
turn to overestimation by managers. And, since managers systematically overestimate the value of their own long-term projects, they will tend to prefer them to at least some short-term
projects that have superior returns. We refer to this phenomenon as long-term bias. The definition of long-term bias, thus,
is the mirror image to that of short-term bias.
Table 1: Definitions
Long-Term
Bias
Short-Term
Bias

A preference for a long-term investment
over a superior short-term investment/return.
A preference for a short-term investment/gain over a superior long-term investment/return.

The intuition for long-term bias is straightforward: managers tend naturally to be enamored with their projects as a
whole, resulting in a skew that leans (over time) towards their
long-term projects. This is only the starting point for our analysis, however. Relying on evidence and theory from overconfidence bias literature in general, and managerial overconfidence bias in particular, Section III.A argues that long-term
investments are prone to overestimation as they typically involve high degrees of uncertainty, significant illusions of control, weak accountability mechanisms and remote feedback.
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Then, as Section III.B shows, natural constraints on overconfidence (and debiasing over time) are likely to be especially
limited when it comes to long-term projects, resulting in systematic long-term bias. In Section III.C, we make use of case
studies to illustrate how long-term bias has manifested in
managerial decisions involving three well-known companies.

A. Long-Term Investments: Magnified and Influential
Overconfidence
Drawing on an extensive literature in psychology and behavioral finance, this Section will show that several factors
have been identified as contributing to managerial overconfidence. These factors include: high upside potential, vagueness
of a project’s likelihood of success, illusion of control, excessive
reliance on one’s own skills, competition neglect, commitment
to the project, and dismissal of incoming feedback and data.
Moreover, we argue, each is more salient with respect to longterm projects. As a result, overconfidence is especially high,
influential, and resilient with respect to long-term projects.

1. Managerial Overconfidence – Overestimating
Probabilities of Success
Overconfidence, sometimes known as the “Lake Wobegon”
effect, has been documented extensively. For example, most
people rank themselves above average in a range of skills and
circumstances, including driving skills and the likelihood they
remain healthy and married.114 More than 90% of people, in
114 See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 813–14, 818–19 (1980)
(finding individuals tend to believe they are more likely than their peers to
experience positive events and less likely to experience negative events.
Types of events considered included one’s health, longevity, employment
and marriage); Lynn A. Baker, & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time
of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993); Thomas G. Calderon,
Predictive Properties of Analysts’ Forecasts of Corporate Earnings, 29 MIDATLANTIC J. BUS. 48–52 (1993); Manju Puri, & David T. Robinson, Optimism
and Economic Choice, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 97 (2007); David A. Armor &
Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic
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fact, rank themselves above average in driving skills;115 70%
of high school students ranked themselves above average in
leadership skills;116 and 94% of college professors rated their
work to be above average.117
But what about corporate managers? One might think that
a competitive business environment might restrain overconfidence, making executives more realistic. Yet, in a range of
studies—including experiments, surveys and data analyses—
managers demonstrated an exceptionally prodigious “better
than average effect.”118 Indeed, executives are highly optimistic with respect to the likelihood of their projects’ success. For
example, while a majority of U.S. startups only survive for
several years, the vast majority of U.S. entrepreneurs (80%)
estimated that their business would “succeed” (against a

Optimism, in HEURISTICS & BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334, 334–36 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter, Armor &
Taylor, When Predictions Fail].
115 Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our
Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981).
116 David Dunning et al., Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for
Health, Education, and the Workplace, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 71–106
(2004).
117 K. Patricia Cross, Not Can, But Will College Teaching be Improved?,
17 NEW DIRECTIONS IN HIGHER EDUC. 1, 9–10 (1977).
118 See, e.g., Laurie Larwood & William Whittaker, Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving Biases in Organizational Planning, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 194, 198 (1977) (MBA students and corporate presidents exhibited
better than average effects, both in estimating their own skills and in estimating their companies’ predicted growth rates); J.B. Kidd & J.R. Morgan,
A Predictive Information System for Management, 20 OPERATIONAL RES. Q.
149, 162–65 (1969) (finding that managers predict better operational performance than they eventually achieved); Campbell Harvey et al., Managerial Attitudes and Corporate Actions, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 109–12 (2013)
(CEOs gained an average optimism score of 20.34 relative to 14.33–15.15 in
the general population); James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404, 1410–11 (1987). Executives also exhibit another form of overconfidence, an “over preciseness”
effect, that is, overestimation of the accuracy of their predictions. See, e.g.,
Itzhak Ben-David et al., Managerial Miscalibration, 128 Q. J. ECON. 1547,
1558–63 (2013) (finding miscalibration among CFOs)
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background five-year median survivorship measure).119 Rather than accepting risk estimates as given, executives typically believe that with the right efforts and planning they can
significantly improve their odds of success.120 And, they exhibit this proclivity even with respect to pure chances
events.121
It is almost certainly the case that some degree of optimism
is a de facto job requirement for managers and entrepreneurs
whose job description, after all, requires them to overcome
their own risk aversion and analysis paralysis. Nevertheless,
there can be too much of a good thing, and recent literature in
behavioral finance finds overconfidence to be correlated with
financial losses and investment distortions. Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate, who pioneered much of this research,
developed measures for CEOs’ overconfidence levels, testing
its effects on firms’ investments and acquisitions.122 As proxies for overconfidence, Malmendier and Tate adopted two
main measures—press mentions of the CEO as confident, and
the extent to which the CEO holds on to options and stock of
the company, rather than selling.123 Presumably, risk-averse
CEOs, who are highly invested in their company (their future,
trajectory and compensation are all affected by the firm’s success), should diversify the equity compensation they receive
as soon as their contract allows. If, however, the CEO believes
that investors underestimate the value of her company, she
might hold on to her options and stock despite the associated

119 See Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs’ Perceived Chances for
Success, 3 J. BUS. VENTURING 97, 103 (1988).
120 See March & Shapira, supra note 118, at 1410–11.
121 Id. at 1406–07. See also Ellen J. Langer & Jane Roth, Heads I Win,
Tails It’s Chance: The Illusion of Control as a Function of the Sequence of
Outcomes in a Purely Chance Task, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 951,
954–55 (1975).
122 See generally Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 34; Ulrike
Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment? CEO Overconfidence Measures Revisited, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 649
(2005) [hereinafter Malmendier & Tate, Measures Revisited].
123 See Malmendier & Tate, Measures Revisited, supra note 122, at
652–53.
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diversification costs.124 In evaluating these two measures for
overconfidence, Malmendier and Tate found that overconfident CEOs “overpay for target companies and undertake
value-destroying mergers.”125 Interestingly, they also found
evidence for personal loss for these executives from their overconfidence. 126
Significantly, Malmendier & Tate found, overconfident
CEOs tend to pose the largest danger when they have lots of
“house money” to work with in the form of cash flow available
to them from within the firm.127 Overconfident CEOs use such
internal cash flows to pursue large investments. However,
since they overestimate their projects’ actuarial prospects,
they also believe that their firm stock price is too low; and accordingly, if they had to raise external funds from investors to
finance their ideas, they become more reluctant to invest. 128
One influential study found that independent directors that
were mandated by exchanges’ listing standards played an important role in restraining overconfident managers and mitigating overconfidence costs.129 For firms with overconfident
managers, adding independent directors to the board, even if
only to comply with the then-newly-enacted listing standards,
resulted in lower investments and higher profitability.130

See id.
Malmendier & Tate, Acquisitions, supra note 35, at 20, 30–31, 34
(finding that overconfident CEOs were more than 1.5 times more likely to
acquire other companies, and their acquisitions triggered significant negative market responses).
126 See Malmendier & Tate, Measures Revisited, supra note 122, at 653
(“Indeed, it appears that CEOs who hold all the way to expiration would
have been better off on average by exercising (1, 2, 3, or 4 years) earlier and
simply investing the proceeds in the S&P 500.”).
127 Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 34.
128 Id. See also J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33 (2002) (developing a model that shows how managerial optimism results in a sensitivity of investment to cash flow).
129 See Suman Banerjee et al., Restraining Overconfident CEOs
Through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 28
REV. FIN. STUD. 2812, 2822–37 (2015).
130 Id. at 2812 (finding that in firms that added independent directors
to comply with the mandate, “overconfident CEOs reduce investment and
124
125
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2. Long-Term Projects: Little Optimism is
Sufficient for High Overestimation
The previous Section surveyed evidence showing that managers frequently overestimate the probability of their projects
to succeed.131 That is, they are optimistic in general. But such
an argument is not enough by itself to establish a long-term
bias. Below, we show several ways that managerial optimism
is likely to be especially distortive in assessing long-term investments. That is, for long-term projects, even a moderate
level of optimism bias could result in a far larger overestimation of the project’s expected value, relative to its objective,
expected value.
One key reason optimism disproportionally affects longterm projects is that optimism has greater distortive effect as
the volatility of the project’s potential outcomes increases.
Long-term projects must be “in the oven” for extended periods,
during which risk and uncertainty continue to percolate. Consequently, long-term projects frequently involve higher overall volatility. Thus, for long-term projects, both the potential
upside and downside are relatively large. As illustrated below,
however, since overconfident managers overestimate upside
prospects, the large upside associated with more volatile longterm projects results in a larger distortion of the project’s expected value.132
To illustrate, consider two hypothetical investments a firm
might undertake, a long-term investment (“LT”) and a shortterm investment (“ST”). Assume that both investments involve some uncertainty and risk. In particular, there are two
potential outcomes of equal probability to each investment. As
depicted in Table 2, ST could produce a payoff of either 200 or
320, each with 50% probability, and thus the investment has
an expected value of 260. LT produces either 0 or 500, each
with 50% probability.133 Thus, investing in LT involves a
risk exposure, increase dividends, improve post-acquisition performance,
and have better operating performance and market value”).
131 See supra Section III.A.1.
132 See infra tbl.2.
133 To be sure, overconfidence also leads managers to underestimate
volatility, especially with respect to long-term assessments. Yet, due to the
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higher volatility of outcomes (that is, a higher range between
potential outcomes) than ST, but a lower expected value (250
relative to 260).
A manager who makes decisions according to objective, unbiased expected value assessments would obviously choose to
pursue investment ST, as it involves higher expected returns
with lower risk.134 But an overconfident manager may not. To
see why, suppose that the manager is overconfident about her
abilities, in that she believes that for either investment, the
probability of the good outcome to occur is 60% rather than
50%, and accordingly the probability of the bad outcome to occur is only 40%.135 As Table 3 shows, exhibiting overconfidence
toward both investments results in a stark reversal in the
rank of investment ST relative to LT: with optimistic probabilities, the expected value of investment LT seems higher
than the expected value of investment ST (300 relative to 272).
While an optimistic manager overestimates the probability of
a good scenario for both investments, she overestimates the
expected value of investment ST by less. The manager’s optimism is thus amplified by the volatility of the long-term investment.136 Consequently, overconfident managers might be
significantly higher objective volatility of long-term projects, managers assign a higher volatility to long-term project than to short-term ones. See
Ben-David et al., supra note 118, at 1561–63.
134 For purposes of illustration, assume that all risk is diversifiable so
that volatility does not matter. To be sure, if risk is not diversifiable, risk
aversion could make the LT investment less desirable for the manager. Yet,
managers display a significantly high tolerance for risk. See e.g., Harvey et
al., supra note 118, at 109 (finding that only 9.8% of CEOs displayed a low
risk tolerance relative to 64% of the general population); Po-Hsin Ho et al.,
CEO Overconfidence and Financial Crisis: Evidence from Bank Lending
and Leverage, 120 J. FIN. ECON. 194201–06 (2016) (finding that banks with
overconfident CEOs were more aggressive in lending during the recent financial crisis. Overconfident banks issued more loans, increased their leverage more, experienced higher rates of loan defaults and greater drops in
market value).
135 For a formal modeling of managerial optimism as reflected in optimistic probability estimations, see Heaton, supra note 128.
136 To be sure, if managers dislike losing, loss aversion could increase
their preference for the ST low volatility investments. Yet, as shown in Section III.B.3, supra, managers significantly underestimate the probability of
failure, believing that they have a control on it, and can bring it close to
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drawn to long-term projects because of the high upside that
they offer. Indeed, overconfident managers—measured using
options-based proxies, and the character of descriptions in the
press—invest disproportionally in R&D, where payoffs are inherently quite uncertain.137
Table 2: Long-Term Volatility
Potential
Outcomes

Objective
Probabilities Objective EV

Short
Term

200

320

0.5

0.5

260

Long
Term

0

500

0.5

0.5

250

zero, which practically eliminates, in their mind, their risk of losing. See
March & Shapira, supra note 118, at 1410–11; Christoph Schneider & Oliver Spalt, Conglomerate Investment, Skewness, and the CEO Long-Shot
Bias, 71 J. FIN. 635 (2016) (finding that in allocating capital within conglomerates, managers allocated disproportionally large amounts of capital to investments with high positive skewness, that is, investments with only a low
probability of high payoffs); KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 28, at 252
(“[O]ptimistic bias is a significant source of risk taking.”).
137 See David Hirshleifer et al., Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?, 67 J. FIN. 1457, 1471–73 (2012). The association of volatility and overconfidence is not limited to executives’ behavior. For instance, analysts’
overconfidence bias increases with uncertainty, measured by standard deviation of earnings forecasts. See Lucy F. Ackert & George Athanassakos,
Prior Uncertainty, Analyst Bias, and Subsequent Abnormal Returns, 20 J.
FIN. RES. 263, 267–70 (1997).
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Table 3: Long-Term Volatility and Overconfidence
Potential
Outcomes

Optimistic
Probabilities

Optimistic
EV

Short
Term

200

320

0.4

0.6

272

Long
Term

0

500

0.4

0.6

300

Note that the bias towards long-term investments in this
example does not rely on an assumption that managers are
more optimistic for long-term investments. Rather, the analysis assumed the same probabilistic degree of overconfidence
toward both investments. In particular, these examples assumed that for both LT and ST an optimistic manager will
place a probability of 60% on the good scenario instead of 50%.
As we show in the following Section, the example above may
even be a “best case” scenario where long-termism emerges.
That is, in many realistic settings, the manager may also systematically overestimate the probability of the good scenario
for the LT project, exacerbating the above distortion even further.

3. Optimism is Stronger for Long-Term Projects
The previous Section illustrated how even “equal opportunity” optimism can disproportionally favor long-term investments—simply by dint of the higher volatility of such projects due to their longer time periods. This Section will argue
that there are additional reasons to believe that optimism
manifests specifically for long-term projects. That is, for longterm projects managers will be particularly prone to overestimating the probability of success more than they would for a
short-term project. Recall that the previous Section assumed
that for both the LT and the ST investment, an optimistic
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manager would assess the probability of the good scenario to
occur as 60%, instead of the objective probability of 50%. Below, we will argue that for LT projects, she plausibly will assess this probability to be even higher. For example, while the
overconfident manager will assess the probability of a ST project to succeed at 60% instead of the objective 50%, the same
overconfident manager will assess the probability of the LT
project to succeed at 70% or 80% instead of the objective 50%.
This overconfidence “premium” for long-term projects can be
driven by many factors—an illusion of control, overestimation
of the relevance of one’s skills, competition neglect, commitment to the project, and the absence of a reference class138—
each of which, we argue, is aggravated as investment time periods extend. We discuss each factor in turn.
An emerging academic literature finds that managers are
overconfident with respect to the likelihood that their project
will succeed in part because they believe that they can control
the underlying risk. Surveys of executives have found, for example, that managers typically believe with the right efforts
and planning, they can significantly improve the odds of their
project to succeed.139 This illusion of control is so strong, one
study found, that executives rarely accept risk estimates as
given—even with respect to pure chance events they tend to
exhibit undue optimism.140 The long time horizon that longterm investments entail mechanically perpetuates this illusion of control—as executives convince themselves that over
time solutions will be found and obstacles will be overcome.
For example, Navistar’s CEO Ustian vested his complete confidence in a revolutionary EGR technology in part because his
company had nearly a decade to develop the technology before
new environmental standards were scheduled to come into effect.141 Similarly, even after it was clear that Yahoo was drawing its final breaths, Marissa Mayer in her last interview
See, e.g., David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The
Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1082, 1087–88 (1989).
139 March & Shapira, supra note 118, at 1410–11.
140 Id. at 1410.
141 See infra notes 263–70 and accompanying text.
138
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suggested that several more years was all she needed in order
for her plan to succeed and for Yahoo to be saved.142
A second factor that asymmetrically increases managers’
long-term overconfidence is their tendency to overestimate the
relevance of their own skill.143 For long-term projects, where
ambiguity reigns, these biases have real bite, since it is not
yet clear which skills could maximize success.144 Indeed, ambiguity has been shown to magnify optimism: in one influential study, when subjects were free to come up with different
traits that justify their high evaluation of themselves, they
were highly optimistic.145 When they were given a list of traits,
however, they ranked themselves lower than they previously
did.146 For long-term projects, thus, where details are most
lacking and fortunes most ambiguous, managers will focus on
their positive skills, traits and general advantages, even if
those traits will turn out to irrelevant to the project’s fate.
Third, managers also neglect other managers’ skills and
accordingly disregard potential competition. For example, in
an entry game experiment, managers were more likely to enter the market with a new company when they were told that
success in competition was skill-driven than when it was
drawn randomly.147 For long-term projects, this bias is
See Goovaerts, supra note 25.
See KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 28, at 255–64; Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 27 (1993) (“People also exaggerate
their control over events, and the importance of the skills and resources they
possess in ensuring desirable outcomes.”).
144 Furthermore, even when information is available, people tend to
think about future events in general form and postpone the details to a later
time. See, e.g., Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110
PSYCHOL. REV., 403, 405 (2003) (“Construal level theory (CLT) specifically
proposes that individuals use more abstract mental models, or higher level
construals, to represent information about distant-future events than information about near-future events.”); Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal and Time-Dependent Changes in Preference, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 888 (2000).
145 See Dunning et al., supra note 138, at 1084–85.
146 Id.
147 See Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306, 314–15 (1999)
142
143
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plausibly stronger since future competition is difficult to predict when the project is initiated. Furthermore, competition
neglect is exacerbated when a manager overestimates the relevance of his skills, which, as argued before, is also more likely
with respect to long-term projects. 148
Finally, there is also direct evidence that a distant “finish
line” promotes higher degrees of overconfidence directly. For
one example, college students were fairly optimistic about
their first-year salaries, but became significantly less optimistic as graduation approached.149 Similarly, students were
more optimistic with respect to their performance in a midterm exam when asked at the beginning of the semester, than
on the day of the exam itself.150 Furthermore, subjects who
were asked to predict their performance in a number of arbitrary tasks were significantly more optimistic when asked
long before the task than immediately prior to performing
it.151
Executives’ predictions, too, appear more optimistic with
respect to long-term projects. A study analyzing three- to fiveyear earnings growth forecasts among executives found that
these long-term forecasts were highly overoptimistic, significantly exceeding actual growth rates.152 In fact, the average
long-term growth forecast predicted (15%) was five times

(finding in an experiment that overconfidence about skill leads to excessive
entry).
148 Id.
149 See James A. Shepperd et al., Abandoning Unrealistic Optimism:
Performance Estimates and the Temporal Proximity of Self-Relevant Feedback, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 844, 846–48 (1996). Juniors’ and
sophomores’ optimism, in contrast, did not decline over the year, suggesting
that the proximity to benchmarking moments uniquely dampens optimism.
See id.
150 See Thomas Gilovich et al., The Effect of Temporal Perspective on
Subjective Confidence, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 552, 553 (1993);
see also Armor & Taylor, When Predictions Fail, supra note 114, at 334–35.
151 See Gilovich et al., supra note 150, at 553–54.
152 See David S. Koo & P. Eric Yeung, Managers’ Forecasts of LongTerm Growth in Earnings: New Information or Cheap Talk? 2–3 (unpublished manuscript), https://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/Eric%20Yeung.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ9C-5QMB].
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larger than the average realized growth rate (3%).153 Also, consistent with their optimistic long-term beliefs, overconfident
CEOs were found to specifically bargain for more options-intensive compensation packages.154
In sum, the emerging literature on managerial overconfidence, its origins, and its triggers lends both direct and indirect evidence to the idea that optimism bias is likely to thrive
systematically with regard to long-term projects.

B. Weak Constraints on Long-Term Optimism
The previous Section argued that optimism’s origins and
triggers interact materially with long-term horizons and the
vagueness of the project. Still, these findings alone would still
not pose a particular problem if there existed reliable constraints that put a damper on long-term biases. We take up
this issue below, arguing that the usual constraints on overconfidence tend to be weaker for long-term projects.

1. Inside View, Outside View, and Durable LongTermism
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who made seminal
contributions to the research of overconfidence bias, explored
several ways that optimism could potentially be mitigated. As
they found in a well-known series of experiments, optimism
results from people’s tendency to adopt an “inside view”—
based solely on plans, scenarios and simulations they run subjectively, while ignoring an “outside view”—one based on statistical analysis and aggregate data from similarly situated
cases.155 The inside view can fall prey to natural biases, since
one’s plans tend naturally to focus on success scenarios and
discount potential obstacles. In short, managers “rarely plan

Id.
See Mark Humphery-Jenner et al., Executive Overconfidence and
Compensation Structure, 119 J. FIN. ECON. 533, 538–42 (2016).
155 See Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 28, at
421.
153
154
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to fail.”156 For example, people who were asked to assess the
time of task completion in experiments constructed forecasts
that were close to the best-case scenario while ignoring relevant statistics and past experiences with obstacles.157 As a result, they suffered from a “planning fallacy”—a common bias
in estimating how long it takes to complete a task.158
If, however, one contrasts these individual best-case scenarios (the inside view), with a data driven analysis (the outside view), debiasing is possible.159 For example, when college
students were asked to forecast their future academic performance, on average they predicted it would be better than 84%
of their peers.160 However, when students were asked first
about their entrance scores, as well as their peers’ entrance
scores, their predictions were significantly less sanguine.161
Thus, to avoid unrealistic predictions, Kahneman and
Tversky recommend that managers should conduct a “reference class forecasting”—that is, in making forecasts with respect to their own projects, managers should rely on the distribution of outcomes of similar “benchmark” projects.162
People, however, frequently ignore the outside view.163 For
example, despite the evidence that accounting for the outside
view could result in a significantly better estimation of time

156 David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, Situated Optimism: Specific
Outcome Expectancies and Self-Regulation, 30 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 309, 323 (1998); see also KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note
28, at 252–253.
157 See Roger Buehler et al., Exploring the “Planning Fallacy”: Why
People Underestimate Their Task Completion Times, 67 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 366, 379 (1994).
158 See KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 28, at 250.
159 See Lovallo & Kahneman, Delusions, supra note 28, at 63 (“The outside view is more likely to produce accurate forecasts and much less likely
to deliver highly unrealistic ones.”).
160 See id. at 61.
161 See id. (noting that a second group of students, when first asked
about their entrance scores, predicted to perform better than only 64% of
their peers).
162 See Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 28, at
418–19.
163 See id.; see also Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 143, at 26.

2_2020.1_BARZUZA & TALLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1:104]

LONG-TERM BIAS

9/28/2020 6:30 PM

149

of completion,164 an entire team working on a curriculum construction project for the Israeli Army ignored this information,
leading to a drastic underestimation of time of completion.165
This tendency to ignore the outside view affects managers and
organizations alike.166 For their part, managers are not likely
to solicit such a view, and even if they do, it can frequently be
ignored.167 Indeed, a review of several hundred forecasts of
transportation infrastructure projects’ costs found that not
one of them included a reference class forecast.168
Long-term projects belong to a special class—one that
would benefit most from the outside view (if adopted), but at
the same time are least likely to receive it.169 The value of the
outside view seems evident for long-term projects, which (as
discussed above) involve especially high levels of optimism,
which can substantially distort their value.170 For several reasons, however, managers are not likely to contrast these longterm projects with data. First, an outside view requires identifying an appropriate reference class—a group of similar

See KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 28, at 250.
See id. at 245–47.
166 See Lovallo & Kahneman, Delusions, supra note 28, at 61, 63.
167 See id. (“Even when companies bring in independent consultants to
assist in forecasting, they often remain stuck in the inside view. If the consultants provide comparative data on other companies or projects, they can
spur useful outside-view thinking. But if they concentrate on the project
itself, their analysis will also tend to be distorted by cognitive biases.”).
168 Bent Flyvbjerg et al., How (In)accurate Are Demand Forecasts in
Public Works Projects? The Case of Transportation, 71 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N.
131, 141 (2005). See also BENT FLYVBJERG ET AL., MEGAPROJECTS AND RISK:
AN ANATOMY OF AMBITION 6 (2003); Bent Flyvbjerg et al., What Causes Cost
Overrun in Transport Infrastructure Projects?, 24 TRANSPORT REV. 3 (2004).
169 Cf. Lovallo & Kahneman, Delusions, supra note 28, at 63 (“The outside view’s advantage is most pronounced for initiatives that companies
have never attempted before—like building a plant with a new manufacturing technology or entering an entirely new market. It is in the planning of
such de novo efforts that the biases toward optimism are likely to be great.
Ironically, however, such cases are precisely where the organizational and
personal pressures to apply the inside view are most intense.”).
170 See supra notes 131–42 and accompanying text.
164
165
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projects—that would provide relevant data.171 Long-term projects, however, are typically unique (often by design), making
a reference class scarce, or highly subjective.172 Furthermore,
since managers construct long-term investment plans around
their unique skills, external benchmarks might make them
even more skeptical that a posited reference class has probative value.173
Second, the initial plan of a long-term project is predominantly composed of inspiration, rather than detailed implication, and is pregnant with the promise of vagueness that reduces the likelihood that managers will contrast it against
benchmarking data. Kahneman and Tversky found that more
than any other factor, the main reason that people ignore the
outside view is the strength of the narrative they have, and
particularly its coherence.174 A good, coherent story often carries far more weight than cold, statistical evidence.175 And a
good coherent story, as Kahneman explains, is especially conjurable when objective facts are scarce:
You build the best possible story from the information
available to you, and if it is a good story, you believe
it. Paradoxically, it is easier to construct a coherent

171

See Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 28, at

417–18.
See Lovallo & Kahneman, Delusions, supra note 28, at 63 (“Of
course, choosing the right class of analogous cases becomes more difficult
when executives are forecasting initiatives for which precedents are not easily found. . . . Imagine that planners have to forecast the results of an investment in a new and unfamiliar technology.”).
173 See Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 28, at
416 (“The tendency to neglect distributional information and to rely mainly
on singular information is enhanced by any factor that increases the perceived uniqueness of the problem.”).
174 See Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 28.
175 See KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 28, at 264 (“[C]onfidence is
determined by the coherence of the story one has constructed, not by the
quality and amount of the information that supports it.”). In a line of experiments Tversky and Kahneman found that coherency has a significant, if
not the most significant, influence on predictions. See Kahneman &
Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 28.
172
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story when you know little, when there are fewer
pieces to fit into the puzzle.176

For long-term projects, since little information is available
(almost by definition), managers are free to construct alternative scenarios, all of which could be designed to be perfectly
coherent, and highly overconfident.

2. Lack of Clear and Immediate Feedback
In addition to a lack of existing comparison benchmarks,
overconfidence for long-term projects also tends to lack another bridling force, in the form of clear and immediate feedback. Several researchers have found that the mere expectation of clear and immediate feedback dampens undue
optimism in making predictions.177 In one experiment, for example, participants were asked to assess the likelihood of testing positive for a serious medical condition.178 Assuming that
they would receive the results in three to four weeks, participants were overoptimistic, assessing a less than average likelihood.179 Yet, close to the end of the experiment, after these
participants learned that results would be available in a few
minutes, they largely abandoned their optimism, assessing an
average likelihood instead.180
With long-term projects, however, feedback is often vague,
noisy, and distant. Such projects are by definition cash flow
money pits early on, whose performance is measurable only
years down the road.181 Furthermore, in the long-term, managers have plenty of opportunities to attribute failure to exogenous events that are not in their control. Such discounting of
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 28, at 201.
Armor & Taylor, When Predictions Fail, supra note 114, at 339–40
(reporting studies showing that optimism is sensitive to the timing of expected feedback).
178 Kevin M. Taylor & James A. Shepperd, Bracing for the Worst: Severity, Testing, and Feedback Timing as Moderators of the Optimistic Bias,
24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 915, 917 (1998).
179 Id. at 923.
180 Id.
181 See generally Stefano Dellavigna & Joshua M. Pollet, Investor Inattention and Friday Earnings Announcements, 64 J. FIN. 709 (2009).
176
177
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negative interim feedback—often referred to as attribution
bias—further weakens the power and discipline of feedback
on long-term projects.182 The feedback is less intimidating,
since managers know, whether consciously or not, that many
things that might happen could be responsible for a project’s
failure.

3. Limited Learning
While impoverished learning is a problem for any project,
managers’ persistence and stubbornness in the face of new relevant information is particularly pernicious and damaging in
the context of long-term projects. By the time information arrives, managers are typically already highly invested in their
project’s success, and their future career trajectories are also
in play. Such highly motivated reference points, several studies have found, impede learning and exacerbate overconfidence.183 People motivated to reach a result search their
memory for facts and beliefs that support it, and ignore negative information.184 For example, subjects who were promised
a refund for finishing their tax filings early showed higher optimism with respect to the time needed to complete their reports.185
Second, even though the initial business plan for long-term
projects is often based on sparse information—and thus is
likely to have low predictive power—due to a phenomenon
182 See, e.g., Dale T. Miller & Michael Ross, Self-Serving Biases in the
Attribution of Causality: Fact Or Fiction?, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 213, 213–18
(1975); N.T. Feather & J.G. Simon, Attribution of Responsibility and Valence
of Outcome in Relation to Initial Confidence and Success and Failure of Self
and Other, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 173, 173–75 (1971).
183 See infra notes 187–96 and accompanying text.
184 See, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 482–83 (1990).
185 Roger Buehler et al., The Role of Motivated Reasoning in Optimistic
Time Predictions, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 238, 241 (1997);
see also Rose W. Marks, The Effects of Probability, Desirability, and “Privilege” on the Stated Expectations of Children, 19 J. PERSONALITY 332, 349–50
(1951) (summarizing a study in which children were more likely to predict
that they would draw a particular card from a mixed pack when they stood
to gain a point for each card).
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known as anchoring bias, subsequent assessments of the project are highly influenced by initial assessments, even if they
were informed by forecasts that were admittedly arbitrary.186
In a RAND Corporation study of major companies, for example, costs of process plants turned out to be more than double
that initially assessed, and financial performance less than
half that anticipated.187 Thus, anchoring on uniformed initial
plans could result in significant costs since anchoring persists
even when the initial numbers are clearly wrong.188
Third, for typical long-term projects, relevant information
is revealed only gradually. This can lead to a biased and asymmetric form of updating, where managers habitually dismiss
negative information and embrace positive news, thereby reinforcing their initial optimism. Asymmetric treatment of positive versus negative news has been observed in numerous experimental contexts, as well as in neuroscience studies.189 In
a line of magnetic resonance imaging based studies, for example, participants were asked to estimate their likelihood of experiencing particular adverse life events such as Parkinson’s
disease, Alzheimer’s disease, car theft, or robbery, before and
186 See Lovallo & Kahneman, Delusions, supra note 28, at 60 (“This intuitive and seemingly unobjectionable process has serious pitfalls, however.
Because the initial plan will tend to accentuate the positive—as a proposal,
it’s designed to make the case for the project—it will skew the subsequent
analysis toward overoptimism.”); Dan Ariely et al., ‘Coherent Arbitrariness’:
Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences, 118 Q. J. ECON. 73, 75–
77 (2003); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974).
187 EDWARD W. MERROW ET AL., RAND CORP., A REVIEW OF COST ESTIMATION IN NEW TECHNOLOGIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY PROCESS PLANTS 70–
73 (1979).
188 Timothy D. Wilson et al., A New Look at Anchoring Effects: Basic
Anchoring and Its Antecedents, 125 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 387, 397–99
(1996) (warning participants of an anchoring effect did not help them avoid
it); Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect: Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 437, 442–44 (1997) (anchoring effects were found even though initial numbers were clearly wrong).
189 Sharot et al., supra note 30, at 1475 (“[H]ighly optimistic individuals exhibited reduced tracking of estimation errors that called for negative
update in right inferior prefrontal gyrus.”).
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after they were presented with the average probability of
these events happening to people in their socio-cultural environment.190 Participants’ updating their beliefs in response to
information was remarkably asymmetric—brain activity
showed a failure of the frontal lobe region to code undesirable
information, when coding would have reduced the individual’s
optimism (by increasing the probability of an adverse
event).191 Furthermore, overconfidence is associated with
stronger updating bias. In a field experiment, the Canadian
Inventor Assistance Program provided inventors with an objective assessment of the commercial prospects of their invention.192 After receiving a projection of failure (which as the organization track record suggests was highly accurate), only
half of the inventors abandoned their project.193 Furthermore,
persistence was associated with high individual optimism and
resulted in average losses.194 On top of a more pronounced updating bias, a common source of asymmetric updating, attribution bias—namely, the tendency to take credit for success
and attribute failure to bad luck195—is also stronger for longterm investments, since the longer time-horizon typically presents multiple opportunities for managers to chalk up failure
to exogenous events.
Finally, evidence supports the phenomenon of managers’
resistance to feedback with respect to long-term investments.
Overconfident CEOs, who were found to have weak inclinations to amend material errors in their forecasts in light of
corrective feedback, were especially unresponsive when the
feedback related to forecasts with long time horizons.196
Id.
See id. at 1477–78.
192 Thomas Astebro, The Return to Independent Invention: Evidence of
Unrealistic Optimism, Risk Seeking or Skewness Loving?, 113 ECON. J. 226,
227–28 (2003).
193 Id. at 237.
194 Id. at 236.
195 See e.g., Miller & Ross, supra note 182, at 213–18; Feather & Simon,
supra note 181, at 173–75.
196 Guoli Chen et al., Making the Same Mistake All Over Again: CEO
Overconfidence and Corporate Resistance to Corrective Feedback, 36 STRATEGY MGMT. J. 1513, 1530–31 (2015).
190
191
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C. Illustrative Examples – Long-Term Bias and Hedge
Fund Activism
In the previous Sections we have argued that overconfidence and optimism bias are present for corporate managers,
that they are particularly likely to be concentrated in longterm projects, and that the usual factors that bridle or dampen
the effects of overconfidence are also likely to be limited with
long-term investments. In this Section we turn to a series of
case studies that offer examples from three well-known companies (Yahoo, AOL and Navistar) where long-term investment decisions were arguably biased by overconfidence, and
their most deleterious effects were ultimately interrupted by
hedge fund activism. Section III.C.1 discusses the hiring of
Marissa Mayer by the Yahoo board, her investments as Yahoo’s CEO, activist Starboard Value’s intervention to cut investments, and the eventual sale of Yahoo’s core assets to
Oath—a Verizon subsidiary led by Tim Armstrong, the former
CEO of AOL. Section III.C.2 discusses Armstrong’s $1 billion
investment in his own long-term project, Patch, during his
tenure as AOL’s CEO—followed by the company’s eventual
sale due to an intervention by the same activist. Section III.C3
discusses Navistar’s long-term investment in the novel EGR
technology, advocated by then-CEO Dan Ustian, which resulted in Navistar becoming the target of three hedge fund
activists, Ustian’s ouster, and SEC charges levied against
both Ustian and Navistar.
Any of these episodes could have been described as examples of short-termist interventions in long-term investments
(and indeed they were so characterized at the time).197 A closer
197 See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Lessons from the AOL Proxy Fight, HARV.
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 22, 2012),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/06/22/lessons-from-the-aol-proxyfight/ [https://perma.cc/AQL9-L5PH] (“These results confirm that investors
will not blindly follow the recommendation of ISS—when presented with a
well-articulated and compelling plan for the long-term success of the Company, they are able to cut through the cacophony of short-sighted gains
promised by activist investors touting short-term strategies.”); Sanjay
Sanghoee, Yahoo’s Mayer Should Take On Starboard, FORTUNE (Oct. 23,
2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/10/23/how-yahoos-mayer-should-take-on-
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inspection, however, reveals that each of them also involved
factors that betray the markers of managerial overestimation
of (and overinvestment in) long-term projects. In each case,
the significant potential upside was highly tempting; the inevitable vagueness of each initial plan fostered illusions of
control, overestimation of managerial skill, and competition
neglect. The managers became highly committed to their longterm visions and unrealistically invested in the project/strategy as contrary facts dribbled in. Importantly, in all cases the
company was generating a significant internal cash flow that
underwrote the long-term projects.

1. Marissa Mayer’s Long-Term Plan for Yahoo
On the morning of July 11, 2012, Marissa Mayer, then a
Google executive, entered Gibson Dunn & Crutcher’s offices in
Palo Alto, CA. Mayer was one of the four finalists for Yahoo’s
CEO position, and this was the final meeting with the Yahoo
board before it made a final decision.198 Going in, Mayer’s odds
at landing the job appeared long (to say the least). Yahoo’s
board was concerned that Mayer, who had recently been demoted from Google’s search division and top management
team, did not have the experience to manage a company of
Yahoo’s size: Mayer had never managed or even headed a division in a public company (she managed roughly 20 employees at Google), and she evidently had little managerial
starboard/ [https://perma.cc/RG85-K8XH] (“Jeffrey Smith, who runs Starboard, is in the business of maximizing shareholder wealth in the shortterm. But Mayer’s job is to create value in the long-term, and in the Starboard version of this deal, she may have to give up the growth strategy that
could be key to Yahoo’s success.”); Joe Nocera, Out of the Spotlight, an Industry Copes With Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/business/29nocera.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/L66W-CVSW] (“Though no one at Navistar can prove it,
they strongly suspect that the stock has been hammered because hedge
funds, badly hurt during this phase of the financial crisis, have been forced
to sell some of their more liquid positions to return money to exiting shareholders. I suspect this theory is correct, and it would be yet another way
that fallout from the financial crisis has spread from New York to the rest
of the country.”).
198 See CARLSON, supra note 21, at 229–30.
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experience with accounting statements.199 Furthermore,
Mayer faced serious competition from within Yahoo: Ross Levinsohn, the interim CEO, had interviewed earlier that morning and had support from most of the members of Yahoo’s
board.200
Mayer and Levinsohn floated markedly different visions
for Yahoo’s future. Levinsohn offered the board a safe, lowrisk low-reward plan—to take Yahoo out from competition
with Google and Facebook by moving it to the content business.201 Mayer, on the other hand, offered an ambitious longterm plan, that, if successful, could make Yahoo directly competitive with Google and Facebook.202 While some board members initially preferred Levinsohn’s safer plan,203 others
viewed it as overly conservative “small ball”, preferring the
high upside of Mayer’s vision.204 As the evening of July 11
wore on, the latter faction prevailed and Yahoo’s board voted
unanimously to name Marissa Mayer as CEO.205
There is little doubt that Yahoo’s board, in selecting Mayer,
opted for her high-risk/high-reward long-term plan. And, as
noted above, a high volatility, big upside is one of the reasons
why long-term investments can be vulnerable to overestimation. Indeed, even a little overconfidence on the board’s side
199 See id. at 237–38 (An unnamed Google executive opined on Mayer’s
hire: “It will be a struggle. She’s never managed more than ten to twenty
people. She’s a product person who hasn’t managed sales, business development, human resources and all that.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200 See id. at 220 (“For the two months prior, the new chairman of Yahoo’s board, Fred Amoroso, had made it clear that he was going to do everything he could to make sure Levinsohn and his team would be running the
company for the foreseeable future.”).
201 See id. at 220–21.
202 See id. at 229–31.
203 See id. at 231 (“The directors who opposed Mayer—most vocally
Amoroso, but also Brad Smith and David Kenny—argued that Levinsohn,
with his ‘media’ strategy, had a better plan for Yahoo than Mayer and her
‘products’ strategy. They argued that Mayer may present a greater upside—
she was more likely to come up with the next Facebook or Google Maps or
Twitter—but that Levinsohn was the safer bet, a more guaranteed return.”).
204 See id. at 221 (“Harry Wilson, another director brought onto the
board by Loeb, joined Wolf in his criticism of the deal as ‘shortsighted.’”).
205 See id. at 233.
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as to the plan’s prospects to succeed could lead to great overestimation of the plan. A long-term investor in Yahoo—Citi’s
Mark Mahaney—expressed concerns about the risk involved:
What we are a bit worried about is that by selecting
Ms. Mayer, Yahoo! is explicitly pursuing an aggressive
and bold Growth strategy, whereas we believe a Value
strategy might be more appropriate.206

Furthermore, a long-term horizon could arguably have
contributed to the overestimation of the relevance of Mayer’s
skills to the success of the plan, while neglecting potential
downstream competition. Adding to the credibility of Mayer’s
plan was her user-focused experience at Google and her pedigree with search technology.207 The plan’s features were
closely related to Mayer’s skills: creating great apps for daily
habits such as news, weather, email, and photos.208 And most
notably, the plan involved creating a new search application,
which Mayer believed could significantly improve Yahoo’s
search market share and revenues.209 Mayer and the board,
however, did not predict how intensely competitive the apps
market was about to become. When Yahoo Apps finally came
out—as companies, startups, and individuals were all constantly producing iPhone applications—only two of Yahoo’s
apps made it to Apple’s top 100 downloaded apps.210
206 Robert Hof, What Google Veteran Marissa Mayer Can Do As Yahoo's
New CEO, FORBES (July 16, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2012/07/16/surprise-googles-marissa-mayer-is-yahoos-newceo/#2cec2c8c7e0f [https://perma.cc/5Q3Z-8C9Y]. Overconfidence with respect to long-term projects affects investors only to a limited extent, if at all.
For a discussion of the internal factors that affect managers’ overconfidence
and long-term bias see infra Section III.B.
207 See, e.g., Amir Efrati & John Letzing, Google's Mayer Takes Over as
Yahoo Chief, WALL ST. J. (July 17, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303754904577531230541447956
[https://perma.cc/GK32-KSS2] (“Yahoo's board selected Ms. Mayer because
‘she stands for the user,’ in contrast with a string of the company's previous
CEOs who had little experience with consumer websites, said a person with
direct knowledge of the company's CEO search.”).
208 See CARLSON, supra note 21, at 250–51.
209 Id. at 285–86.
210 See id. at 305.
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Shortly after becoming Yahoo CEO, Mayer embarked on a
shopping spree, spending hundreds of millions of dollars to acquire dozens of small startups.211 Mayer relied on internal
funds—proceeds that Yahoo was receiving predominantly
from its holdings in Alibaba.212 Yet, when Yahoo’s initial acquisitions and investments did not produce the desired results, Mayer’s solution was to double down with more investments.213 Mayer announced to shareholders a potential plan
to sell Yahoo’s Alibaba holdings and use half of the proceeds
to further invest in Yahoo’s long-term plan.214 This was an explicit deviation from Yahoo’s initial plan, pre-Mayer, to distribute such proceeds to investors.215
On July 29, 2014, Eric Jackson published a Forbes column
titled, How Do You Solve a Problem Like Marissa? advocating
the need to stop Mayer from spending, and to require management to distribute the Alibaba proceeds to shareholders.216
Jackson noted that Yahoo’s market value was—incongruously—below that of the company’s holdings in Alibaba, a fact
suggesting that investors placed a negative value on Yahoo’s
core management.217 Shortly after publication of Jackson’s
See Jackson, infra note 216.
See id.
213 See id.
214 See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Aug. 9, 2012)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/000119312512347591/d394429d8k.htm
[https://perma.cc/5GXP-26KM] (“Ms. Mayer is engaging in a review of the
Company’s business strategy to enhance long term share-holder value. . . .
This review process may lead to a reevaluation of, or changes to, our current plans, including our restructuring plan, our share repurchase program, and our previously announced plans for returning to shareholders
substantially all of the after tax cash proceeds of the initial share repurchase under the Share Repurchase and Preference Share Sale Agreement
we entered into on May 20, 2012 with Alibaba Group Holding Limited.”).
215 See id.
216 Eric Jackson, How Do You Solve a Problem Like Marissa?, FORBES
(July 29, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericjackson/2014/07/29/howdo-you-solve-a-problem-likemarissa/33447f527b6d [https://perma.cc/GC4JPL8K].
217 See id. (“[I]nvestors would rather get all of the cash coming back to
Yahoo from the pending Alibaba IPO as well as what’s already on the balance sheet, rather than see CEO Marissa Mayer and her management team
211
212
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column, Mayer’s management became the target of Starboard
Value CEO Jeff Smith, a renowned activist.218 Echoing Jackson’s concerns in a letter to management, Smith warned
against Mayer spending additional capital on acquisitions and
implored her to distribute it to shareholders.219 At first, Mayer
cut a secret deal with Smith to cut costs and increase buybacks, in return for Smith’s forbearance on a proxy fight.220
Yet, following this agreement, Yahoo’s expenses began to accelerate.221 Indeed, despite Yahoo’s weak results, Mayer did
not seem to lose faith in her plan and its potential to rehabilitate Yahoo. On the company’s Q3 2015 earnings call, Mayer
reiterated her belief in her long-term plan for Yahoo stating,
“[o]verall, I have very aggressive expectations for Yahoo's core
business. We have the right talent, the right strategy, and the
right assets to drive long-term sustainable growth for our

spend it on value-destroying acquisitions.”); see also Letter from Jeffrey C.
Smith, Managing Member, Starboard Value LP, to Marissa Mayer, President & CEO, Yahoo! Inc. (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/starboard-delivers-letter-to-ceo-and-board-of-directors-of-yahoo-inc-277223182.html [https://perma.cc/BLK3-U3YL] (“This
substantial valuation gap is likely due to the fact that investors currently
expect Yahoo to continue its past practices of . . . using the cash proceeds
from such sales to acquire businesses at massive valuations with seemingly
little to no regard for profitability and return on capital.”).
218 Smith was not the first activist to target Yahoo. Dan Loeb, who
brought Mayer to Yahoo, also pressured her to cut costs and return Alibaba
money to shareholders. See CARLSON, supra note 21, at 276. But he exited
Yahoo several months earlier—taking on Mayer’s offer to greenmail him.
See id. at 276 (“Mayer went to Loeb and told him that Yahoo would buy forty
million of his Yahoo shares at $29 per share. That was more than twice what
he paid for them in the summer of 2011. The deal would reduce Third Point’s
stake in Yahoo below 2 percent, forcing Wolf, Wilson, and Loeb to step down
from the board, per Third Point’s settlement from the year prior.”).
219 See Letter from Jeffrey C. Smith, Managing Member, Starboard
Value LP, to Marissa Mayer, supra note 217.
220 See Douglas MacMillan, Yahoo’s Marissa Mayer Stumbled After Secret Truce with Investor, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoos-marissa-mayer-stumbled-after-secrettruce-with-prodding-investor-1466174597 [https://perma.cc/DP6Q-9NUN].
221 See id.
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investors.”222 Then, when the balance of its investments
turned out to be unsuccessful, Mayer embarked on a new,
“bet-the-company” gambit called Project Index, a mobile
search application that Mayer believed would make Yahoo
competitive with Google.223
Four years down the road and close to $3 billion in spending on over fifty acquisitions later,224 the plan did not produce
the growth investors and management hoped for. Quite to the
contrary, Yahoo’s quarterly reports for Q1 2016 were exceptionally weak, showing declines across the board in Yahoo’s
businesses’ market share and profitability.225 On April 27,
2016, Yahoo reached a deal with Starboard’s Smith to nominate four members to the board.226 And, in the end, it was
Smith who successfully pushed for Yahoo to sell its core business.227 On July 25, 2016 Yahoo announced it closed a deal
with Verizon in which Yahoo would sell its core businesses to
Verizon for (a relatively modest) $4.8 billion.228
Whether Yahoo could have been saved had Mayer acted
differently we can never know for sure. While there is no doubt
that Yahoo had long been a sinking ship that perhaps no one
(including Mayer) could have righted, it is likely that Mayer
would have forged ahead with her turnaround plan absent the
222 Edited Transcript of YHOO Earnings Conference Call or Presentation, THOMSON REUTERS STREETEVENTS (Oct. 21, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20151105015501/http://finance.yahoo.com/news/edited-transcript-yhoo-earnings-conference-055111175.html [https://perma.cc/7A2XWMUG].
223 See MacMillan, supra note 220.
224 See Sophie Kleeman, Here’s What Happened to All 53 of Marissa
Mayer’s Yahoo Acquisitions, GIZMODO (June 15, 2016), https://gizmodo.com/heres-what-happened-to-all-of-marissa-mayers-yahoo-acqu1781980352 [https://perma.cc/MQN5-BDAN].
225
See Yahoo! Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 4–8 (May 9,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/000119312516584244/d152715d10q.htm
[https://perma.cc/VC2X-8P94].
226 See MacMillan, supra note 220.
227 See id.
228 See Vindu Goel, Verizon Announces $4.8 Billion Deal for Yahoo’s
Internet Business, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/26/business/verizon-yahoo-sale.html
[https://perma.cc/4CV6-ESKX].
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Starboard intervention.229 In a telling interview Mayer gave
shortly before Yahoo was sold, Mayer refused to concede to her
mistakes. Rather, she insisted, “[w]hat’s needed . . . is a little
more time.”230 Time, along with Mayer’s long-term plan, she
argued, would solve the problem.231 In this unconquerable
faith one can discern many of the seeds of long-term bias (as
we have defined it). Mayer’s ambitious, high potential upside
plan for Yahoo arguably acted to magnify the influence of
overconfidence bias. In addition, due to the distant finish line,
the inevitably vague nature of the plan, building it around
Mayer’s skills and ignoring the role of luck and potential competition arguably led to an even higher level of overconfidence.
Finally, Mayer’s determination to stick to her guns, ignoring
negative feedback and a mounting trove of negative data, is
also symptomatic of long-term bias, where learning from feedback is limited by managers’ attachment to the project.

2. Tim Armstrong, AOL, and Patch
In an interesting (if ironic) twist, Yahoo’s core assets (now
held by Verizon) would come to be managed by Tim Armstrong, a one-time salesperson who became the CEO of AOL
(prior to its acquisition by Verizon). Under Armstrong’s initial
leadership, Oath—a Verizon subsidiary—managed the combined assets of Yahoo and AOL.232 Similar to Mayer,
229 See Todd Spangler, Yahoo’s False Prophet: How Marissa Mayer
Failed to Turn the Company Around, VARIETY (May 24, 2016), https://variety.com/2016/digital/features/marissa-mayer-yahoo-ceo-1201781310/
[https://perma.cc/K6T5-2NXZ] (“Others say Mayer refuses to admit her failures, a stick-to-her-guns hubris that has made Yahoo slow to correct course
when things weren’t working.”).
230 See Goovaerts, supra note 25.
231 See Swisher, supra note 1 (Charlie Rose asked Ms. Mayer “here we
are . . . [w]hen you look at what has happened, what did you do wrong?”
She responded: “well, . . . I don't think the story has yet played out. . . . A lot
of tech turnaround adds we do take five, six, seven years . . . .”); MacMillan,
supra note 25 (“We have a three-year strategic plan. I can see how it will
work and how we can actually get to a successful turnaround of Yahoo . . .
.”).
232 In September 2018, Armstrong and Verizon parted company. See
Sarah Krouse, Verizon’s Internet Boss Tim Armstrong in Talks to Leave,
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Armstrong left Google to save AOL, which, like Yahoo, was
listing at the time he arrived. Saving AOL was a significant
ask, but Armstrong believed that AOL was undervalued,
could benefit from a big bet, and was producing sufficient cash
from its internet access business to invest in a necessary turnaround.233 Furthermore, Armstrong believed he had a winning
card—Patch, a local news web platform that Armstrong had
created while at Google.234 The application’s core idea was
somewhat akin to the personalized news approach of platforms like Facebook, but was to be differentiated by creating
a local community of users and a hub for business owners—
one of the so-called “last white spaces on the Internet.”235
Armstrong believed that Patch would provide the growth
trajectory that would save AOL, and accordingly, he conditioned his acceptance of the offer to run AOL on Patch’s acquisition.236 After joining AOL, Armstrong started pouring money
into the project. Under his and the AOL board’s stewardship,
AOL’s investment in Patch neared $500 million.237 And, as
with Mayer, Armstrong’s use of internal funds soon became
the target of Starboard Value CEO Jeff Smith. On January
13, 2012, Armstrong and AOL management met with Smith
and his team, who wanted to discuss AOL’s Patch expenses.238
Smith came prepared with a detailed presentation: running
the numbers for Patch, he argued, even under best-case scenarios, showed that Patch eventually would not cover the
costs of salaries it was currently paying its employees.239 Armstrong’s response presentation included a big-picture plan—
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/verizons-internetboss-in-talks-to-leave-1536321413 [https://perma.cc/WF5U-FN4L].
233 See Nicholas Carlson, The Story Behind Why AOL CEO Tim Armstrong Fired an Employee In Front Of 1,000 Coworkers, BUS. INSIDER (Nov.
6, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/tim-armstrong-patch-aol-201310?op=1 [https://perma.cc/TDJ3-HJ6V].
234 Id. Additionally, Armstrong already put some of his own money into
Patch and had an old friend, Jon Brod, become CEO of the company. See id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 See id.
238 Id.
239 See id.
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literally drawn on a white board with many boxes and arrows,
but no numbers or financial details—a mixed-media composition that Smith found disconcerting.240
After three more meetings on Patch failed to reach a resolution, and in what has become a common ritual for hedge
fund intervention, Smith demanded board representation.241
When Armstrong refused, Starboard commenced a proxy
fight, which ultimately faltered.242 Martin Lipton was quick to
declare the result as a victory of a “well developed” and “wellarticulated” long-term management strategy over a shortterm, short-sighted, hedge fund strategy.243 As Lipton explained in a client memo, the AOL victory showed that when
management presents a “compelling long-term strategy,” investors “are able to cut through the cacophony of short-sighted
gains promised by activist investors touting short-term strategies.”244
Yet, in order to win the proxy fight, Armstrong was forced
to cut a deal, making a promise that Patch would turn profitable by the end of 2013, or it would be cut loose.245 Following
this promise, Armstrong became even more involved in the
product, visiting Patch offices at least once a week and actively sharing his ideas with the product designers and with
creative director Abel Lenz.246 As the time passed, however, it
became increasingly clear that Patch would not deliver on
Armstrong’s promise. Armstrong nevertheless refused to
Id. (“As an activist investor, Smith has to meet with management
teams all the time. For him, it's obvious when they know how their core
businesses fit together with the businesses they are trying to grow and develop. But looking at Armstrong's board, full of arrows going all over the
place, it seemed to Smith that Armstrong and his team were just grasping
at straws, hoping that something they threw at the wall would stick.”).
241 Id.
242 See id.
243 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 197 (“The victory represents a clear and
powerful message that a well-developed and well-articulated business strategy for long-term success will be supported by investors notwithstanding
activist generated criticism and ISS support.”).
244 Id.
245 See Carlson, supra note 233.
246 Id.
240
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acknowledge what his team was seeing.247 And, when AOL’s
CFO Arthur Minson, who played a key role in winning the
proxy fight, became vocal about his skepticism of Patch, Armstrong fired him.248 Eventually, however, in August 2013,
close to the looming deadline, Armstrong finally realized that
there was no way around cutting Patch costs significantly.249
This defeat took an exceptional emotional toll on him.250 In an
incident that would become notorious around Silicon Valley,
Armstrong impulsively fired Abel Lenz during a company conference call involving around 1,000 coworkers.251 The event,
which was later described as “probably the most intense

moment you’ll ever hear during a workplace conference
call,”252 was received as a negative sign of Armstrong’s
leadership temperament.253 On January 15, 2014, AOL re-

linquished its control in Patch.254 The day after the announcement, AOL’s market price rose 8%.255 Investors evidently appreciated Armstrong’s commitment to his promise.256 In many
247 Id. (“Armstrong's apparent stubbornness and blindness with respect to Patch, moreover, continued to cause significant friction between
him and his senior team.”).
248 Id. (“Minson was quite vocal about his skepticism about Patch. And
in February 2013, Armstrong suddenly fired him.”).
249 Id.
250 See id. (That Friday in August, Armstrong was finally making a
decision that he had needed to make for a long time. And it was killing
him.”).
251 See Carlson, supra note 32.
252 Id.
253 See Carlson, supra note 233 (“[M]ost people across the country and
world saw it as gratuitous and humiliating: What's wrong with Tim Armstrong, people wondered? What kind of CEO fires some poor guy in front of
all his colleagues? What did this say about what was going on at AOL?”).
254 See Nicholas Carlson, The End of an Error: AOL Just Disposed of
Controlling Interest in Patch, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/aol-just-disposed-of-controlling-interest-in-patch-2014-1
[https://perma.cc/4JSC-42FG].
255 Nicholas Carlson, Tim Armstrong Finally Got Rid Of Patch, And
Wall Street Loves It, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 16, 2014), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/tim-armstrong-killed-baby-wall181300569.html[https://perma.cc/RGZ4-9ZUM].
256 See Carlson, supra note 254 (“Patch was always a mistake. But today, Armstrong deserves tons of credit for honoring a promise he made to
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respects, though Smith and Starboard lost the proxy fight,
they won the war.257 Without Starboard’s intervention, Armstrong likely would not have made his promise about Patch,
and almost certainly would have soldiered ahead before giving
up the idea of Patch becoming the engine of AOL growth.258
Within our framework, the investment in Patch demonstrates the vulnerability of long-term projects to overconfidence, and especially the difficulty their initiators confront in
responding to negative data, including the unpleasant task of
abandoning ship when needed. Armstrong became highly attached to Patch, and to the extent that he did not compute the
bottom-line profitability, resisted incoming negative information, did not learn from feedback events, and—close to the
end—became defensive and vindictive, losing (at least momentarily) his usual superb leadership skills. Looking back at
the Patch episode with new perspective, Armstrong enumerated his mistakes, confessing regret for not looking at incoming data and proceeding too fast with the project:
[T]he mistake I made was going . . . too bullish down
a path without making sure those early positive metrics were actually coming true in all the other markets. . . . The criticisms we were getting, a lot of them
were probably accurate. We could have done a better
job out of the gates narrowing that focus. That’s really
helped me since then, I think, improve my style of
management but also just the judgment piece of like
how to correctly make judgments about things overall. 259
shareholders – especially since he has always had a deep emotional connection to the Patch project.”).
257 See David Carr, AOL Chief’s White Whale Finally Slips His Grasp,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/business/media/aol-chiefs-white-whale-finally-slips-his-grasp.html?_r=1
[https://perma.cc/3WJJ-YEFG] (“The insurgents lost the war, but turned
out to be right.”).
258 See Carlson, supra note 254 (“We're pretty sure that if he had his
way, AOL would still be investing in Patch. But he made a promise, and he
stuck to it.”).
259 Recode Staff, Full Transcript: Oath CEO Tim Armstrong on Recode
Media,
RECODE
(Sept.
3,
2017),
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3. Dan Ustian, Navistar & EGR Technology
With no engineering background, but nonetheless climbing
the ladder from within, Dan Ustian became the CEO, President, and Chairman of the Board of Navistar Inc.—an international manufacturer of trucks, busses and diesel engines—
in 2004.260 Under Ustian’s leadership Navistar became a
poster child for R&D investment and growth—embarking in
new directions, such as military vehicles and school buses,
with global reach and technological innovation.261 Ustian’s
commitment to innovation and long-term growth was so
strong, in fact, that some suggested he appeared to be managing an internet incubator rather than a truck and engine company.262
In 2001, the Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA”)
issued a new regulation that would require the industry to
meet a new, stricter quality standard for nitrogen dioxide pollutant—one that would have to be met by 2010.263 Rather than
using the industry standard Selective Catalytic Reduction
(“SCR”) technology, which Navistar’s competitors were all relying on to meet the new regulations, Ustian wanted Navistar
to develop a novel, unique technology.264 The new technology
https://www.vox.com/2017/9/3/16243970/transcript-oath-ceo-tim-armstrong-aol-patch-verizon-yahoo-recode-media
[https://perma.cc/9WDXMLNX].
260 See Joann Muller, Death By Hubris? The Catastrophic Decision
That Could Bankrupt A Great American Manufacturer, FORBES (Aug. 2,
2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joannmuller/2012/08/02/death-by-hubris-the-catastrophic-decision-that-could-bankrupt-a-great-american-manufacturer/#37a35fe06fbb [https://perma.cc/VUS4-VKN6].
261 See Joe Cahill, Suits Can Innovate, Too, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Mar. 31,
2012),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20120331/ISSUE01/303319959/suits-can-innovate-too
[https://perma.cc/F4B7-L4R7]
(“Navistar CEO Dan Ustian churns out new products so fast, you’d think he
was running an Internet incubator, not a 175-year-old company that once
made the McCormick reaper.”).
262 Id.
263 See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty
Engine and Vehicle Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 5,002 (Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 69, 80 and 86).
264 See Muller, supra note 260.
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that Ustian envisioned—Exhaust Gas Recirculation—had
clear advantages: it was less costly to apply and, more importantly, it saved drivers the need to keep an additional tank
in the truck.265 If successful, EGR could provide Navistar with
a significant competitive advantage266—a typical Ustian obsession (according to Navistar employees).267 In 2007 Navistar
officially declared that it would pursue EGR technology rather
than implement SCR, which would “come with a steep cost to
our customers.”268 Accordingly, EGR became a central piece of
one of the three pillars in Navistar’s long-term growth strategy.269
Because of EGR’s novelty, there was a risk that it might
not meet the EPA standard in time (or ever), but Ustian believed the engineers could achieve needed improvements by
Id.
See Press Release, Navistar Int’l Corp., International Trucks and
Engines Will Comply with 2010 Emissions Standards without SCR (Oct. 31,
2007),
http://ir.navistar.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=272413
[https://perma.cc/QQ8U-ZLJK] (“‘While SCR is a means to achieve the NOx
reduction requirement for 2010, it comes with a steep cost to our customers,’
said Daniel C. Ustian, Navistar chairman, president and chief executive officer. ‘Our ability to achieve our goals without adding customer cost and
inconvenience is a competitive advantage for International.’”); Charlie Morasch, Digging Out: Navistar Says Adding SCR to its Trucks and Replacing
its CEO Will Clear the Path Forward, LAND LINE MAG., Oct. 2012,
http://www.landlinemag.com/magazine/2012/oct/Section2/digging-out.aspx
[https://perma.cc/TFZ3-B52T] (“Navistar, Allen said, wanted to have a longterm competitive advantage for its customers and against its competitors.
Allen said such lasting advantages are a rarity, particularly in trucking,
where innovations are quickly emulated.”).
267 See Muller, supra note 260 (“Above all, say those who worked
closely with him, Ustian is obsessed with avoiding what happened to companies like Motorola or RIM, which notoriously lost their market leadership
to more innovative rivals.”).
268 Press Release, Navistar Int’l Corp., supra note 266.
269 See, e.g., Navistar International Corporation, Annual Report (Form
10-K), at 1 (Dec. 21, 2010) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/808450/000119312510285754/d10k.htm [https://perma.cc/7FLW5W2R] (“Our long-term strategy is focused on three pillars: I. Great Products: . . . [f]ocusing on engine research and development in order to have a
competitive advantage using Exhaust Gas Recirculation (‘EGR’) and other
technologies for compliance with 2010 emissions standards . . . .”).
265
266
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2010. Ustian’s confidence was so high, in fact, that the company developed no serious backup plan, as reflected in his answer to a question during an earnings conference call: “Plan B
is we’re going to make Plan A work.”270 Furthermore, when
difficulties with the EGR undertaking began to present themselves early on, Ustian was not open to discuss them with his
engineers. As a former executive would later recall:
Dan is telling his technical people, ‘You’ve got to deliver,’ and they’re saying, ‘We don’t know how, but
we’ll try,’ says the former executive. There was a lot of
tension in the technical community, from the scientists on up to the managers, about whether we should
be agreeing to something we don’t know how to do.
Dan didn’t want to hear any of it. ‘You’re going to get
it done.’ He’s a positive thinker. He doesn’t like negative thinking.271

This behavior raised concerns when Navistar began burning cash on EGR at growing, alarming rates.272 Such expenses,
Ustian reasoned, were necessary for Navistar’s successful
achievement of long-term growth.273 Accordingly, despite a
270 Consolidated Amended Complaint at 38, Construction Workers
Pension Trust Fund – Lake County and Vicinity v. Navistar Int’l Corp., No.
1:13-cv-2111 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2013). See also Muller, supra note 260 (“The
company had banked so many credits in earlier years that it could lawfully
use them, in lieu of fines, all the way until this year. But rather than buying
time for a plan B, Ustian, who was convinced a breakthrough was just
around the corner, plowed forward with his EGR plan, full steam ahead.”).
271 Muller, supra note 260.
272 See Joann Muller, Navistar Starts Paying The Piper For Its Costly
Strategic Mistake, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joannmuller/2012/08/31/navistar-starts-paying-the-piper-for-its-costly-strategic-mistake/#4376b008431d [https://perma.cc/RPQ9-HE68] (“[T]he primary concern, says Gimme Credit analyst Vicki Bryan, is the rate at which
Navistar is burning cash.”).
273 See Press Release, Navistar Int’l Corp., Navistar Reports Solid 4Q,
Year-End Net Income as Weakened Truck Market Continues (Dec. 21,
2009), https://navistar.gcs-web.com/news-releases/news-release-details/international-trucks-and-engines-will-comply-2010-emissions
[https://perma.cc/7G75-3LDQ] (“‘Despite current economic challenges, we
have remained focused on our three-pillar strategy which includes being
profitable in the toughest of times while investing in our future for
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significant decline in Navistar’s share price in 2008, Ustian’s
confidence remained intact: the low market price was due to
hedge funds liquidating their positions to meet recession redemptions and margin calls.274 Similarly, when the company’s
EGR efforts continued to flag and share price again declined
40% in 2012, Ustian’s answer was again moored to innovation:
“We’ve got some more breakthroughs coming.”275 Wall Street,
he argued, was suffering from short termism.276 Some analysts, however, believed that the decline in market price was
not driven by short-termism but rather a lack of faith in management. As the value of the shares sank below $27, reflecting
a multiplier of sales below 0.13 (less than a fourth of the median multiplier of its competitors), Patrick Nolan, an analyst
for Penn Capital who sold its position in Navistar, opined to
Bloomberg: “It’s a high-quality company with a management

profitable growth,’ said Daniel C. Ustian, Navistar’s chairman, president
and chief executive officer. . . . ‘We believe that our customer-friendly solution positions our products with a significant competitive advantage,’ . . . .
‘The momentum established in the wake of these accomplishments positions
us well for long-term success and to take on the challenges that 2010 will
pose for all in our industry.’”); see also Cahill, supra note 261 (“For Mr. Ustian, the answer is innovation: ‘We've got some more breakthroughs coming.’”).
274 Nocera, supra note 197 (“Though no one at Navistar can prove it,
they strongly suspect that the stock has been hammered because hedge
funds, badly hurt during this phase of the financial crisis, have been forced
to sell some of their more liquid positions to return money to exiting shareholders. I suspect this theory is correct, and it would be yet another way
that fallout from the financial crisis has spread from New York to the rest
of the country.”).
275 See Cahill, supra note 261 (“Ustian’s innovations haven’t helped
Navistar’s stock. Wall Street focuses on short-term earnings performance
and truck sales forecasts. Thanks to a recent earnings shortfall and worries
about the new truck engine, shares are down 40 percent from last May’s 52week high and trade at a discount to its industry peers. Corporate raider
Carl Icahn is pressuring the company into a merger.”).
276 See id.
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issue.”277 Indeed, by this time Navistar had become the target
of three activists.278
On July 6, 2012, as a result of the combined pressure of a
declining share value, hedge fund activism and mounting
costs of non-compliance, Ustian finally gave up on EGR, announcing that the company would move to SCR technology.279
After ten years of working on EGR and $700 million in spending280, for the market it was too little too late. Navistar’s
shares fell an additional 15% that day, and the company faced
a real risk of bankruptcy.281 On August 27, 2012 the Navistar
board, which had awarded Ustian with a large compensation
package the year before, ousted him.282 Activist Carl Icahn
however, was not quite done. Icahn believed that any board
that allowed this to happen could not shape Navistar’s future
and navigate it safely out of the bankruptcy risk the company
now faced. On September 9, 2012 Icahn released an open letter to the board of directors demanding board seats.283 On July

277 Mark Clothier & Alex Barinka, Navistar Turns Target After Poison
Pill Adopted: Real M&A, BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-21/navistar-turns-target-after-poison-pilladopted-real-m-a [https://perma.cc/VCL2-99U7].
278 See Scott Malone, Embattled Navistar Adopts Poison Pill as Big Investors Circle, REUTERS (June 20, 2012), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/embattled-navistar-adopts-poison-pill-as-biginvestors-circle/article4356698/ [https://perma.cc/T8PY-QLM6].
279 See Kate Macarthur, Navistar's Plan B Offers Little Confidence in
its Future, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., (July 9, 2012), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20120706/NEWS05/120709911/navistars-plan-b-offers-little-confidence-in-its-future [https://perma.cc/5TCL-66YY].
280 See Jonathan Stempel & Suzanne Barlyn, SEC Charges Navistar,
ex-CEO with Misleading Investors, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-navistar-intl-sec/sec-charges-navistarex-ceo-with-misleading-investors-idUSKCN0WX2GI
[https://perma.cc/4QXG-M4SS].
281 See Macarthur, supra note 279.
282 Soyoung Kim, Navistar Board Ousts CEO Ustian After Failed Engine Bet, REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/usnavistar-ceo/navistar-board-ousts-ceo-ustian-after-failed-engine-betidUSBRE87Q0Y620120827 [https://perma.cc/8H6A-W5ME].
283 Letter from Carl Icahn to Navistar Int’l Corp. Shareholders (Sept.
9, 2012), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/carl-c-icahn-issues-
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15, 2013 Navistar agreed to let Icahn and Mark Rachesky appoint two directors each to Navistar board.284 The board also
raised the company’s poison pill threshold from 15% to 20%.285
In response, Navistar’s shares rose 10%.286
Ustian’s fate at Navistar bears markers of this Article’s
substantive thesis. Like Mayer and Armstrong, Ustian was
drawn to the potential high upside of the EGR project—a development which could provide Navistar with a significant
competitive advantage. The long-time horizon made Ustian so
confident that Navistar could succeed in developing the technology that he deliberately neglected developing a Plan B.287
Along the road, Ustian became increasingly invested in the
project, so much so that he ignored mounting data and engineers’ concerns, and dismissed the anemic market value that
investors accorded Navistar, which to him was simply a reflection of short-termism.288
open-letter-to-board-of-directors-of-navistar-international-corporation169120616.html [https://perma.cc/4SFE-ATQT].
284 See Liz Hoffman, Navistar Deals with Ichan, Rachesky to Avoid
Proxy Fight, LAW 360 (July 15, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/457245/navistar-deals-with-icahn-rachesky-to-avoid-proxy-fight
[https://perma.cc/4GZW-THQJ].
285 Id.
286 See Rohit Tirumala Kumara et al., Navistar Avoids Proxy Battle by
Giving Icahn, Rachesky More Say, REUTERS (July 15, 2013),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-navistarinternational-boardproxy/navistar-avoids-proxy-battle-by-giving-icahn-rachesky-more-sayidUSBRE96E0UZ20130715 [https://perma.cc/7EG6-42YY].
287 See Muller, supra note 260.
288 Furthermore, the SEC has charged Navistar and Ustian for misleading investors about the likelihood of EGR’s success in the company’s
2011 filings. The company has settled with no admission of wrongdoing,
while Ustian is still in settlement discussions with the SEC. See Litigation
Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Daniel Ustian, (Mar. 31, 2016)
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23507.htm [https://perma.cc/SHR8-7K4Z]; Eric Miller, Former Navistar CEO Daniel Ustian, SEC Ready to Discuss Settlement,
TRANSPORT TOPICS (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.ttnews.com/articles/formernavistar-ceo-daniel-ustian-sec-ready-discuss-settlement
[https://perma.cc/3U8M-Y9UC]. See also Catherine M. Schrand & Sarah
Zechman, Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Financial
Misreporting, 53 J. ACCT. &ECON. 311, 311 (2012) (finding that “[o]verconfident executives are more likely to exhibit an optimistic bias and thus are
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing Parts have illustrated, using both academic
literature and a series of case studies, our hypothesis that corporate managers can suffer from an overlooked form of optimism bias that disproportionally affects their assessments of
long-term projects. In this Part, we situate our hypothesis in
the larger debate surrounding activism and short-termism,
analyze how it plausibly interacts with long-termism, and
posit several business and legal implications of our hypothesis.

A. Interacting Biases in Capital Markets
As noted in the introduction, our framework and argument
do not dismiss the possibility that short-term biases exist and
are durable in capital markets.289 Quite the contrary: the longterm bias phenomenon we identify does much to resolve the
curious paradox (articulated above) about how short-term bias
could ever persist in competitive capital markets with professional investors and fund managers. In particular, once one
introduces the conceptual framework of long-term bias it becomes easier to understand why short-term bias has survived
over time, through economic booms and busts. Under the right
circumstances, short-termism can serve as an effective counter ballast for limiting and bridling long-termism (and, vice
versa).
To get a feel for how this interaction might work, consider
our previous example from Tables 2 and 3, and assume that
the manager values the short-term project at its actuarial
value (with equal 50% probabilities of success/failure), but she
optimistically accords a higher assessment (of 60%) to the
long-term project. The manager thus correctly assesses the ST
project to have an expected value of 260 and evaluates the LT
project to have expected value of 300 (reflecting upward bias).
If left to her own devices, she will thus honestly, but erroneously, pursue the LT project. Now suppose an activist investor
more likely to start down a slippery slope of growing intentional misstatements”).
289 See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.
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who owns a 20% stake of the company (and exhibits no biases)
recognizes the manager’s mistake and is considering launching a proxy contest to force a change of strategy to pursue the
ST project. Suppose further that the activist will incur a nonrecoverable cost of 3 in order to execute the contest, which (for
simplicity) we assume will be 100% effective. If the activist is
successful, she will gain a value of 52 (or 20% of the ST project’s payoff of 260) and give up a value of 50 (20% of the “true”
actuarial value of the LT payoff of 250), producing a gross gain
of 2. The activist would nevertheless abstain from launching
the proxy contest, however, since her gross gain (2) is below
her cost of launching the contest (3). She would know with
certainty that the manager was long-term biased, but the private costs of doing anything about it would be prohibitive.
Suppose instead that in addition to the manager’s longterm bias, the activist was herself biased in the opposite direction—in favor of the ST project. Specifically, suppose she
assesses the ST project holds a 60% success probability (while
still judging the LT project’s success accurately at 50%). Now
the activist would perceive the ST project to be worth 272 in
expected value, so that a successful proxy contest would deliver her a (perceived) payoff of 54.4 (20% of 272), less a value
of 50 (20% of the LT payoff of 250), thereby netting her a gross
gain of 4.4. In this case, the activist will find it profitable to
launch the proxy contest, thereby increasing firm value (albeit
by less than she perceives) and delivering greater overall
value to all shareholders. Note that if the manager were not
biased to begin with, then the activist’s short-termism would
potentially be a negative force (rather than a positive one). To
be sure, the interaction of long- and short-term biases probably does not always result in perfectly optimal outcomes, but
by plausibly interacting in this way, short-term bias and longterm bias will tend to mitigate one another’s greatest shortcomings.
Our framework also helps to explain other puzzling observations. For example, consider a positive market response to
an announcement that a hedge fund activist has purchased
company stock and is engaging management. This empirical
result, which has been confirmed in numerous studies,
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suggests that investors view the intervention as valuable.290
Critics of hedge fund activism, however, have argued that this
result suggests that investors are also short-sighted, that is,
they are happy to receive higher payouts in the short-term,
while ignoring the long-term consequences.291 Under ordinary
circumstances, this interpretation would follow only if financial markets were persistently incapable of pricing the longterm effect of activism, an assumption that seems somewhat
of a stretch.292 Furthermore, the market response to activism
varies significantly across firms, and is sometimes negative.293
Why would similarly situated short-term investors respond
negatively to hedge fund engagements in some firms and positively in others? Under this Article’s account, capital market
price responses might also be due to management side factors.
For example, a positive market response could reflect a muchneeded derailing of an undesirable long-term project that was
itself the artifact of long-termism. More generally, the account
offered here predicts that market responses might vary across
firms, activists, and investments—depending on the extent of
long-term (management-side) bias and short-term (investorside) bias that are involved in any particular situation.294

B. Business Implications
The framework developed above—and the symbiotic interaction between long-termism and short-termism—also have
several implications for business operations. We chronicle
three of them here: business investment, investor payout, and
firm governance.

See Brav et al., Firm Performance, supra note 16, at 1730.
See, e.g., Strine, Who Bleeds, supra note 5, at 1894–1895.
292 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 10, at 1123 (“For hedge fund
activism to reduce the wealth of shareholders in the long term, it must be
the case that (i) the elevated stock-price levels following 13D filings represent inefficient market pricing that fails to perceive the expected long-term
costs of the intervention . . . .”).
293 See Coffee & Palia, supra note 10, at 584.
294 See Barzuza & Talley, supra note 48, at 8.
290
291

2_2020.1_BARZUZA & TALLEY (DO NOT DELTE)

176

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

9/28/2020 6:30 PM

[Vol. 2020

1. Overinvestment
Short-termism has been a constant concern of corporate
America’s policymakers, lawyers, academics, and business
commentators. Under conventional wisdom short-term gains
always come at the expense of superior long-term investments
and growth, and accordingly impose significant efficiency
costs on firms and investors. As leading corporate lawyer Martin Lipton harshly warns: “In what can only be considered a
form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in the market
price of their stock at the expense of long-term value.”295
Yet, as we have argued above, managers often have incentives to overinvest in long-term projects. As a result, the
widely held assumption that short-term pressure always
comes at the expense of long-term performance and growth
seems suspect. Short-term pressures (even less than rational
ones) could limit overconfident long-term investment and consequently improve long-term performance and growth. Thus,
the finding that hedge fund activism has led to less investment in R&D—which is often said to be one of the strongest
pieces of evidence against hedge fund activists—by itself does
not imply that activism is either damaging or valuable to
shareholders.296 Rather, it raises an empirical question—what
type of investments are less likely to withstand activism: desirable or undesirable ones? If R&D levels were excessive due
to long-term bias, and activism reduces inefficient overestimated investments, then short-termism would contribute to
long-term profitability and growth.297 Consistent with this
possibility, two recent studies find that while activism reduces
investment in R&D and CAPEX in general, it also leads to
Lipton, supra note 6.
See Coffee & Palia, supra note 10, at 576.
297 Coffee & Palia acknowledge the potential argument that R&D level
was excessive. See id. at 550. Yet, they argue, since managers are compensated for long-term performance, they have no incentive to overinvest. Id.
Yet, overconfidence is not cured by incentive-based compensation. Since
overconfident managers believe in their long-term projects, long term compensation will incentivize them to invest more rather than less in those
long-term projects. See Malmendier & Tate, supra note 34, at 2662.
295
296

2_2020.1_BARZUZA & TALLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1:104]

LONG-TERM BIAS

9/28/2020 6:30 PM

177

increased returns on assets, and higher output measures
(such as more patent registrations and citations).298
To be sure, some others have posited that short-termism
could play a role in limiting overinvestment. Yet, the argument that managers overinvest typically relies on a variety of
agency cost theories. For instance, the common overinvestment theory of empire building posits that managers garner
personal benefits from increasing the size and scope of their
firms, which they achieve via investments and acquisitions.
First, the argument goes, by purchasing other companies,
managers can arguably increase their own compensation. Second, they increase their visibility and importance. Third, they
increase the company’s diversification. Yet, as Coffee and Palia argue, executive compensation today ties compensation to
firm performance.299 Thus, if empire building harms the company, executives should be incentivized not to pursue it. The
long-termist approach we posit, however, does not turn on
agency cost theory, and thus is less susceptible to this criticism. And, since it is driven by overconfidence, incentivebased compensation does not necessarily mitigate the type of
long-termism we have presented. Quite the contrary, overconfident managers—who genuinely (but mistakenly) believe in
the quality of their long-term investments—are encouraged to
invest even more when their compensation is tied to firm
value.300 Indeed, these managers typically negotiate a compensation package that is sensitive to firm value.301

2. Investor Payouts
Another criticism of activist hedge funds concerns the pressure they frequently exert to increase shareholder payouts.
Fearing these pressures, it is argued, firms sacrifice R&D and
298 See Brav et al., Real Effects, supra note 14, at 2724–26, 2753–54;
Brav et al., Innovation, supra note 14, at 238–39.
299 See Coffee & Palia, supra note 10, at 550.
300 See Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 34, at 2696 (“Specifically, standard incentives such as stock- and option-based compensation
are unlikely to mitigate the detrimental effects of managerial overconfidence.”).
301 See Humphery-Jenner et al., supra note 154, at 538–42.
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other long-term investments. Possibly consistent with this behavior, shareholder payouts of S&P 500 companies recently
reached 90% of their income.302 Accordingly, investment in
R&D has declined relative to shareholder disbursements.303
Hedge fund pressure, in turn, is motivated by the funds’ need
for liquidity and the pressure that they face from their investors.
If, however, long-termist managers are predisposed to
overinvest in long-term assets like R&D, forcing shareholder
distributions could curb at least some of these overinvestments. To be sure, disbursing inside capital can sometimes
limit desirable investments. Yet, there is reason to believe
that the pressure to increase payouts will tend disproportionally to limit those investments that are driven by overconfidence. As discussed above, overconfidence thrives on the
availability of internal cash flow (or “house money”) of the
firm.304 If deployment of such resources is poorly monitored,
overconfident managers are more likely to use it for investments.305 When such resources are more tightly constrained,
in contrast, managers will be forced to raise capital externally
and are less likely to invest, presumably since they believe
that their company is undervalued, and external finance is
thus too costly.306 Consequently, placing pressure on the distribution of internal funds disproportionally reduces overconfident investments.
Relatedly, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the
pressure to increase payouts will limit the most problematic
types of long-term investments. For example, value destroying
acquisitions by overconfident managers are more likely and

302 See William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, 92 HARV. BUS.
REV., Sept. 2014, at 46, 48.
303 Dion Rabouin, More Spent on S&P 500 Buybacks Than All 2018
R&D, AXIOS (June 19, 2019), https://www.axios.com/sp-500-buybacks-chartef39e17b-a757-4e21-a1a4-9c248b977791.html
[https://perma.cc/VQG9L98J].
304 See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
305 See Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 34, at 2662–64.
306 Id.
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more harmful when they are financed from internal funds.307
Similarly, the inclination to overinvest is weaker when managers cannot rely on internal finance and must “sell” their
plans to outside financiers.308 This payout pressure thus affects overconfident CEOs more than it does others. Indeed, it
is hardly a coincidence that in the three case studies explored
above—Yahoo, AOL, and Navistar—the companies were generating significant internal cash flows, which were in turn
used to underwrite the long-term strategies.309 The activist
hedge funds that intervened, accordingly, demanded that the
managers distribute some of these cash flows to shareholders
rather than reinvest it. Thus, one way to understand the pressure to increase payouts is that doing so forces managers to
invest (at least in part) external funds rather than internal
funds, and are thereby forced to pitch for and raise capital in
the market for their investments. Thus, they should only pursue these investments if they pass the market test. Consistent
with this interpretation, Fried and Wang recently found that
while firms paid out more than 90% of their cash flow to shareholders, they also issued new equity in significant value.310 In
particular, after new issuances are taken into account, the net
payouts to shareholders were around 41% of net income, less
than half of the total payouts.311

3. Firm Governance
Our arguments may also have implications for firm governance. Long-termism, since it is driven by overconfident
See Malmendier & Tate, Acquisitions, supra note 35 (finding that
overconfident CEO are likely to make value destroying acquisitions, and the
effect is stronger if they have access to internal financing).
308 See Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 34, at 2661–63
(finding that overconfident CEOs “overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing”
and that this “sensitivity of investment to cash flow is strongest for CEOs
of equity-dependent firms, for whom perceived financing constraints are
most binding”).
309 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 216; Carlson, supra note 32; Clothier
& Barinka, supra note 277.
310 See Fried & Wang, supra note 36, at 208–10.
311 Id.
307
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management, underscores the need for effective and engaged
directors.312 Board members have the institutional standing
to provide immediate feedback that could (at least potentially)
constrain overconfidence and long-termism. Indeed, this type
of feedback has been shown to be effective—empirical studies
on the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and the ensuing requirement to implement a majority of independent directors found that effects have been particularly salient in
firms with overconfident managers.313 In firms whose managers were classified as overconfident, investment declined significantly and firm performance has increased.314 We can infer, then, that independent directors limited investment in
projects that were likely to be overestimated by management.315
Activists increasingly nominate members to firms’ boards,
more and more by way of settlements with firms’ management. Such board members, this Article suggests, could play
an important role in limiting overconfident, undesirable investments. Some evidence is indeed supportive of activists’ directors adding value to firms.316 To begin with, when activists
gain board representation they hold stock in the target for a
median of three years.317 Second, one study finds long-term
improvement in operating performance–during the five years
following activism, returns on assets increased by more than
2% on average for these firms.318 The authors then conclude
that:

312 Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 34, at 2695–96 (finding
that “the results confirm the need for independent and vigilant directors”).
313 See Banerjee et al., supra note 129, at 2815.
314 See id.
315 See Coffee & Palia, supra note 10, at 574–76 (surveying studies that
find that hedge fund activism is associated with a decline in R&D investment).
316 See generally Ian D. Gow et al., Activist Directors: Determinants and
Consequences (Harv Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-120, 2014),
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-120_451759fe-d2984072-81d1-b007fd4d5bc0.pdf [https://perma.cc/68TW-HM3A].
317 Id. at 15–16.
318 Id. at 3.
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[T]he relatively long-term holding period in cases
where activists become directors, positive stock market effect, and long-term operating performance improvements seem inconsistent with activist directors
being short-termist.319

C. Legal Policy Implications
Our arguments also bear on several legal and regulatory
reforms that are at various stages of progression. Most of them
are motivated by the view that unalloyed short-termism impairs the proper functioning of capital markets. When one
views short-termism alongside long-termism, however, the
likely effects of these reforms become somewhat harder to
evaluate.

1. Activist Restrictions, Quarterly Reporting, and
Dual Class IPOs
As noted in Part II, significant concerns with respect to
short-termism have led policymakers, judges, academics, and
practitioners—including many who usually object to any form
of regulation in corporate law—to advocate regulatory
changes to curb short-term investing and encourage long-term
management.320 Several statutory or regulatory reforms currently loom large. Most immediately, Congress will soon consider the proposed Brokaw Act, which would require greater
disclosures and limit traditionally profitable strategies of
hedge fund activists.321 The concern of short-term bias, as expressed by co-sponsoring Senator Tammy Baldwin is the direct and almost sole motivation for the Act: “We cannot allow
our economy to be hijacked by a small group of investors who

319

Id. at 4.

See supra notes 80–106 and accompanying text.
See Brokaw Act, S. 1744, 115th Cong. (2017). An earlier version of
the bill was submitted in 2016 but was not voted on. See Brokaw Act, S.
2720, 114th Cong. (2016).
320
321
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seek only to enrich themselves at the expense of workers, taxpayers and communities . . . .”322
If passed, the proposed Act—named after a Wisconsin town
whose century-old paper mill was shuddered by an activist
hedge fund—would direct the SEC to amend Section 13(d) reporting rules in several respects.323 Most notably, the amendment would shorten hedge funds’ reporting window to investors, after they cross the 5% ownership threshold, to four
days.324 Under current law, any investor who buys more than
5% of a firm’s shares is obliged to file a 13D disclosure form
that reports the investor’s identity, ownership, whether the
investor has an intention to take over the company, and other
relevant details.325 At present, investors crossing the threshold have a ten day window to file a 13D from the day they
become a beneficial owner (that is, when they own more than
5%).326 When a 13D is filed, the market learns (often for the
first time) that the firm was targeted by a hedge fund activist,
which typically triggers a significant positive market response. Thus, hedge fund managers typically accumulate
more shares within the ten day window before the price increase takes hold. Shortening the window to four days will
limit the amount of shares that hedge funds can buy at the
pre-announcement market price, and in turn their overall
profits from activism. Second, the amendment will broaden
the disclosure obligation’s applicability to cover short positions and derivatives.327 Third, the Act will broaden the definition of “group” for 13D purposes, explicitly including “wolf
packs” of coordinated hedge funds purchasing parallel initial
blocks.328 To the extent that short- and long-termism counterbalance one another, however, the reforms proposed by the
See Donna Borak & David Benoit, Democrats Take Aim at Activist
Investors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-take-aim-at-activist-investors-1458251491 [https://perma.cc/WXB3BEZY].
323 See S. 1744.
324 Id. § 2(a)(1).
325 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2019).
326 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).
327 S. 1744 §§ 2(b)(2), 2(c).
328 Id. § 2(b)(2).
322
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Brokaw Act may well disrupt that balance in a way that disserves shareholder interest.329
Similarly, the concern of short-term bias and its effects on
long-term growth has led to proposals to eliminate the requirement that firms make their performance public every
quarter.330 And, after a presidential tweet, the SEC issued a
notice for public comment on the proposal.331 Advocates of
these policies tend to cite short-termism as well as compliance
costs that typically are associated with quarterly reporting.332
Our analysis suggests, however, that curbing quarterly feedback could also result in more costly forms of long-termism. A
better direction for federal regulation might be to account for
how short-termism and long-termism interact with (and
sometimes counteract) one another, with the goal of minimizing the costs of both long-termism and short-termism.
Our analysis also helps shed light on another growing
trend—the resurgence of companies going public with a “dual
class” stock structure—under which some shares (typically
the ones belonging to the founders) have significantly more
votes per share than the company’s common stock (purchased

329 We observe that much of the public rhetoric surrounding the
Brokaw Act appears to focus on non-shareholder interests—in particular
that of the laid-off workers the Act’s eponymous Wisconsin town. As discussed elsewhere in this Article, a stakeholder-oriented perspective might
rationalize certain types of long-term deference, but only if doing so compares favorably to a host of other, more direct means to redress stakeholder
interests more directly. See supra notes 51–54, infra notes 273–75, and accompanying texts.
330 See, e.g., Lipton, New Paradigm, supra note 13.
331 See Request for Comment on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-84842, 83 Fed. Reg. 65,601
(Dec. 18, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 210, 230, 239, 240, 243 & 249).
332 See, e.g., Suresh Nallareddy et al., Consequences of Mandatory
Quarterly Reporting: The U.K. Experience 17 (Columbia Bus. Sch., Research
Paper No. 17-33, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2817120 [https://perma.cc/58J4-VDH8]; Matthew Abenante, The
Pros and Cons of Switching From Quarterly to Semiannual Reporting,
FORBES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2018/10/12/the-pros-and-cons-of-switching-from-quarterly-to-semiannual-reporting/#2b6b559a227f [https://perma.cc/TJ49-KC54].
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by outside investors).333 The structure usually results in a governance regime with significant separation of ownership and
control. That is, founders retain sufficient votes to control the
firms even though they own only a small fraction of the economic ownership stakes, and they bear only a part of the consequences of their decisions. Dual class structures have
proven highly controversial as of late, and some securities regulators around the world prohibit it (but not the United
States, yet).334 Scholars have come down on both sides of the
dual class debate, with some excoriating the practice,335 and
others offering explanations as to why dual class stock may
increase value (usually by deterring short-term focused investors from intervening in the founder’s long-term vision and
possibly allowing them to pre-commit not to do so).336 Our
analysis suggests, however, that while founders may sometimes be right in their assessment of their long term vision’s
value, when the embrace of dual class structure is the product
of managerial optimism with respect to long-term investments the decision may be wasteful. That said, we are reluctant to advocate for a blanket prohibition on dual class stock
(as others have championed337). It is difficult indeed for outsiders to unpack the motivations of a founder who embraces a
dual class structure; it may be due to overconfidence (and thus
value-eroding), but it could just as easily be due to a founder’s
genuine desire to protect a project that is inherently difficult
for outsiders to assess. Moreover, the founder might simply
place idiosyncratic value on maintaining control, and is
333 See, e.g., Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: Dual Class IPOs
(Dec. 31, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2019/04/IPOs2018DualClass.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4S3X-H3G4].
334 This could certainly change: at least one sitting SEC Commissioner
has openly entertained the prospect of prohibiting perpetual dual class capital structures. See Robert J. Jackson Jr., Commissioner, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty
(Feb. 15, 2018).
335 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case
for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 601–09 (2017).
336 See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 45, at 576–83, 610–11.
337 See generally Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 335.
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willing to incur the costs of doing so in the form of the price
discount that outside investors will no doubt impose on the
sale (particularly if they are short-term oriented). Whatever
their motivation, dual-class founders will internalize the loss.

2. Directors’ Fiduciary Duties
As developed in Part II, Delaware courts have recently begun to float concerns about short-termism and its implications
for fiduciary conduct.338 Accordingly, several opinions have begun to modify the framework for assessing directors’ fiduciary
duties, requiring that directors “manage for the long-term” on
behalf of “permanent capital” (often favoring common shareholders over preferred shareholders holding redemption or
exit rights).339 Under Delaware law, directors typically receive
the deference of the business judgement rule (the “BJR”): if
they were sufficiently informed and not conflicted the court
will not judge the wisdom of their business decisions with a
hindsight.340 While directors’ fiduciary duties were always understood to require them to act to maximize overall value, the
way they went about doing so (including the relevant time horizons they employed) was presumed to be largely within their
discretion.341 Yet, under the Chancery Court’s emerging
See supra notes 87–106 and accompanying text.
See Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at *18 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2017) (“[T]he fiduciary
relationship requires that the directors act prudently, loyally, and in good
faith to maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the
benefit of the providers of presumptively permanent equity capital, as warranted for an entity with a presumptively perpetual life in which the residual claimants have locked in their investment.” (footnote omitted)); In re
Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 253 (Del. Ch. 2014).
See also Laster & Zeberkieweicz, supra note 13, at 50 (“[T]he blockholder
director’s duties to the corporation require that the director manage for the
long term, while the blockholder director’s duties to the investor require
that the director manage for an exit.”).
340 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981).
341 While Laster draws his decision from what he views as a longstanding duty to maximize long term value, many view the decision as precedential under Delaware law. See, e.g., Jack Bodne et al., VC Laster,
338
339
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jurisprudence, a director who acts to maximize short term
value may be deemed conflicted on that basis alone.342
A long-termist account of fiduciary duties not only strips
directors from the protections of the BJR, but it also results in
the highest standard of review applied by Delaware courts—
the entire fairness standard. Under this standard, which is
typically reserved for direct conflicts of interest such as naked
self-dealing, the director has the burden to prove the fairness
of the transaction process and the fairness of the price.343 The
standard is difficult to meet, and a long-termist litmus test
may well result in a real risk that the director will be found to
breach her duty of loyalty to shareholders. Furthermore,
while Delaware law provides additional layers of protection
for directors from monetary liability for a breach of the duty
of care, it does not (usually) award these protections if the director was found to breach her of duty of loyalty.344 The emerging Delaware approach, then, could expose directors that were
nominated by activist hedge funds to a nontrivial risk of liability. Although the cases applying this new approach to fiduciary duties have thus far largely side-stepped imposing real
consequences for breach, it is likely a matter of time before the
full measure of liability exposure begins to emerge. Based on
the arguments above, we would advise Delaware courts to continue to utilize caution in applying long-termist fiduciary duties—or at least to work through how long-term and shortterm biases interact with one another.
Fiduciary Duties and The Long-Term Rule, LAW 360 (Mar. 11, 2015),
https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2015/03/vc_laster_fiduciary_duties_and_the_long_term_rule.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9ZVH-UM29] (“The notion that directors are required to
maximize value over the long term and that directors who represent stockholders with short-term investment horizons necessarily face a conflict of
interest . . . represent[s] a significant change in the law . . . .”).
342 See In re PLX Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig. No. 9880-VCL, 2018
WL 5018535 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73
A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013).
343 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
344 See John C. Kairis, Disgorgement of Compensation Paid to Directors
During the Time They Were Grossly Negligent: An Available but Seldom
Used Remedy, 13 DEL. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2011).
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3. Executive Compensation
In addition to animating reform proposals in securities regulation and the fiduciary duty framework, short-termism concerns have also been caught up in executive compensation
practices, which some advocates maintain should be changed
to better align managers’ wealth to the long-term performance
of the firm.345 One commentator has argued that: “The most
effective way to curb short-termism would be to lengthen the
time horizons in the compensation packages of asset managers and corporate executives.”346
Long-term compensation packages, the argument goes,
would better align managers incentives with those of the longterm shareholders. Furthermore, long-term compensation
packages also supposedly prevent executives from overinvesting.347 Yet, when such proposals are viewed through the lens
of our argument, the creation of long-term incentives could actually exacerbate the bias of overconfident managers smitten
with their own long-term investments.348 Indeed, overconfident CEOs show higher demand for incentive-based compensation than CEOs that are more dispassionately disposed.349
And yet, these same managers hold onto their options all the
See, e.g., Johnathan Pogach, Short-termism of Executive Compensation, 148 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 150 (2018).
346 Robert C. Pozen, Curbing Short-Termism in Corporate America: Focus on Executive Compensation, GOVERNANCE STUD. BROOKINGS 2 (2014),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Brookings_ShortTermism-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/U227-4QKF]. See also Martin Lipton & Sebastian V. Niles, The Spotlight on Boards 2017, HARV. L.
SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 29, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/29/the-spotlight-on-boards-20172/ [https://perma.cc/4BVH-8AQW] (stating that boards are expected to
“[d]etermine executive compensation to encourage and reward executives
for accomplishing business goals in furtherance of the company’s long-term
strategy”).
347 See Coffee & Palia, supra note 10, at 593–94.
348 See, e.g., Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 34, at 2696
(“Specifically, standard incentives such as stock- and option-based compensation are unlikely to mitigate the detrimental effects of managerial overconfidence.”).
349 See Humphery-Jenner et al., supra note 154, at 538–42.
345
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way until expiry, typically losing money from not exercising
them earlier—that is, their predictions turned out to be overly
sanguine on average.350 Thus, to the extent that managers already suffer from long-term bias, compensation contracts that
double down on such biases are unlikely to improve things.

4. Takeover Defenses and Just Saying No
Finally, our analysis has implications for Delaware’s approach to takeover cases in the particular circumstance where
the company erects defenses to a hostile suitor. If managers
have a long-term plan for the company that a hostile bidder
might interrupt, Delaware courts have consistently allowed
them—under the so-called “Unocal” rule—to resist the suitor
(essentially forever), regardless of the price the bidder is offering to shareholders.351 Delaware courts long ago decided that
managers need not convince the court that their long-term
plan will result in higher better value for shareholders than
the bidder’s offer. Rather, so long as target company directors
are sufficiently informed and genuinely believe that their
long-term plan will eventually result in higher gains for
shareholders, they are allowed to “just say no” to the hostile
acquirer.352 If managers choose to just say no, the inevitable
result is that they block the bidder. Thus, shareholders are
never guaranteed the option of deciding whether to sell their
shares at a premium to the bidder, even if they have lost faith
in management’s long-term plan. To the contrary, the target
board retains significant power to resist, predicated on the
idea that shareholders may mistakenly agree to sell their
shares out of ignorance as to the incumbent management’s
long-term plan.353
See, e.g., Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 34, at 2672.
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985);
see also Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 108–09
(Del.Ch. 2011) (holding that a board complied with fiduciary duties by maintaining a just-say-no defense over a period of years in the face of a hostile
suitor).
352 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1153 (Del. 1989).
353 Id.
350
351
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It is exceedingly unlikely that this area of law (which has
been largely baked since the late 1980s)354 will ever change
dramatically. That said, our analysis suggests that some managers are prone to systematically overestimating the value of
their long-term investments. Consequently, there is a concomitant concern that managers will mistakenly block a high premium offer to shareholders, hoping to protect the sanctity of a
long-term plan that managers honestly (though incorrectly)
subscribe to. Were the Unocal rule rewritten on a blank slate,
our analysis suggests the distinct cost of placing too much discretion in the hands of overconfident managers should be accounted for; at the very least, the potential danger of longtermism should factor into the analysis.355

V. CONCLUSION
A significant and fast-growing literature has increasingly
focused on the purported dangers of short-term bias within
public capital markets. Although the substantive severity of
the short-termism threat is still a topic of much debate, the
argument has galvanized sufficient energy to catalyze both
doctrinal change and numerous institutional reform proposals. Motivated by some curious paradoxes within this debate, this Article has advanced—we believe for the first time—
an argument that, along with short-term pressures, managers
also suffer from long-term biases. Drawing on the extensive
academic literature on overconfidence as well as three realworld case studies, this Article has shown that long-term projects are systematically susceptible to overestimation by managers. The high potential upside such projects offer is
354 See e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the
Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 578, 606 (2003) (noting
the continued longevity of the “just say no” defense).
355 In some respects, the dangers of long-termism could still sneak in
the back door of the Unocal doctrine, through its requirement that a defensive measure must be proportional to the threat posed, and cannot be preclusive or coercive as to an outside hostile bidder. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am.
Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386–88 (Del. 1995). Long-termist business
plans are especially likely to dismiss all outside bids categorically, and thus
could conceivably run afoul of Unocal’s proportionality requirement.
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especially tempting to optimistic managers. And, their long
gestation periods and inherent vagueness further exacerbate
the drivers of overconfidence: the illusion of control, skill overestimation, competition neglect, and stubborn commitment.
Moreover, the factors that usually constrain overconfidence—
clear and immediate feedback, benchmarking data, and learning—are frequently lacking. Our arguments are directly relevant to the ongoing debate over short-termism because they
raise the intriguing possibility of an equilibrium “symbiosis”
between short-termism and long-termism, with each negating
at least some of the worst parts of the other, ultimately resulting in more balanced (if at times contentious) corporate decision-making. Viewed in this sense, long-termism may be the
yin to short-termism’s yang.
The framework developed above, moreover, has implications for both business and legal/regulatory policy. At the very
least, it suggests that we ought to proceed with some measured caution in promulgating institutional elixirs to contend
with the perceived ills of short-termism. Thus far, such reform
efforts are still in their embryonic stages—and as they develop
further, we should remain mindful of maintaining a balance
between addressing short- and long-term biases.
Although our framework leaves us skeptical about the desirability of unalloyed long-termist frames for maximizing
shareholder value alone, it may still prove to be the case that
long-term oriented approaches can reliably implement a more
fully-realized vision of stakeholder governance, where the concerns of employees, customers, creditors, and surrounding
communities also receive nontrivial weight in the firm’s strategy. Interestingly, several traditional defenders of uninhibited managerialism appear recently to have become “woke” to
stakeholder theories of governance.356 Regardless of whether
356 See, e.g., Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtableredefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-thatserves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/84C5-N2WS]; Martin Lipton, It’s
Time to Adopt the New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REG. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/itstime-to-adopt-the-new-paradigm/ [https://perma.cc/LUM3-47XP].
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this epiphany is genuine or instrumental (e.g., to preempt less
management-friendly proposals357), in our view whether longtermist accounts of corporate purpose are an effective way to
harmonize stakeholder welfare concerns with mainstream
corporate law (which have traditionally been uneasy bedfellows) merits exploring. If that is the goal, however, the promise of long-termism as a form of stakeholder governance
should be compared—on an apples-to-apples basis—with
plausible alternatives designed to bring about stakeholder
governance more directly. Such alternatives include alternative “double-bottom-line” corporate structures (such as the
public benefit corporation), alternative financing arrangements (such as green bonds), tax incentives, and regulatory
policy.358 This larger debate is almost certainly one worth having, and one that raises issues—and hopefully attracts solutions—that will make us all better off in the long (if not the
short) term.

357
358

See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying texts.
Id.

